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DIVIDE & CONCUR:
SEPARATE OPINIONS & LEGAL CHANGE
Thomas B. Bennettt Barry Friedman,tt Andrew D. Marttnttt
& Susan Navarro Smelcertttt
To the extent concurring opinions elicit commentary at all,
it is largely contempt. They are condemned for muddying the
clarity of the law, fracturing the court, and diminishing the
authoritative voice of the majority. But what if this neglect, or
even disdain, of concurring opinions is off the mark? In this
article, we argue for the importance of concurring opinions,
demonstrating how they serve as the pulse and compass of
legal change. Concurring opinions let us know what is hap-
pening below the surface of the law, thereby encouraging liti-
gants to push the law in particular directions. This is
particularly true of a type of concurrence we identify here for
the frst time: the "pivotal" concurrence. Pivotal concurrences
occur when one or more members of a court majority also
choose to write separately, undercutting the majority's rule in
the case. Under the Supreme Court's "rule of fve," lower
courts ought to disregard pivotal concurrences and adhere to
the majority opinion. But as we show here, that is hardly the
case.
Utilizing a dataset created for this purpose, we demon-
strate that pivotal concurrences are more common than one
might think, are becoming yet more so, and-despite the Su-
preme Court's admonition to the contrary-are taken quite
seriously by lower courts. Especially in constitutional, salient
cases, lower courts appear to disregard a binding majority
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opinion in favor of the path offered by the concurrence. Rather
than condemning this, we rely on the historical development of
concurrences to show the vitalfunction they play in motivating
and smoothing the way for legal change. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, we argue, there is beauty in a fractured court.
Precisely in those cases that are most high-stakes and most
contentious, it is inportant that the Justices reveal their indi-
vidual views. Those views send essential signals to litigants
and lawyers about where legal change is possible and where
it is not, helping both to temper expectations and to move the
law itself
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INTRODUCTION
Concurring opinions get no respect. Majority opinions gar-
ner most of the spotlight-and rightly so, given their status as
binding law.' Dissents too have their admirers-not only be-
cause they present the case against the majority, but because
there is something romantic about the idea of the Great Dis-
senter, speaking beyond today's majority to the future. 2 When
it comes to concurrences, though, commentators have strug-
gled to see their significance or majesty.
Indeed, when concurrences garner attention at all, it is
often disdain.3 That disdain is understandable. Even at their
best, concurring opinions can read as gratuitous declarations;
at worst they muddy the law. No one likes a "fractured" court.
Concurring justices are thought to put their egos ahead of col-
legiality and coherence. They undercut the authority of a court
speaking with a unified voice.4 Expressing concerns like these
early in his tenure, Chief Justice John Roberts vowed to seek
consensus and to persuade his colleagues to relinquish going
their separate ways.5
But what if this neglect, or even disdain, of concurring
opinions is off the mark?
1 See Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?,
123 YALE L.J. 1692, 1694 (2014) ("[In most appellate courts ... important issues
of law [are] settled by majority decision[.]").
2 See ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR 3 (1974) ("Like a seer, the dissenter
sometimes peers into the future."); Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, in
JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 27, 48 (1953) (describing dissenters as heroic "gladia-
tor[s] making a last stand against the lions"); infra note 91.
3 See, e.g., Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst
the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 299, 299 (2008) (discussing the difficulties that divided courts present
to onlookers and lower courts trying to determine precedent); Michael W.
Schwartz, Our Fractured Supreme Court, POL'Y REv., Feb.-Mar. 2008, at 3-7 (dis-
cussing the virtues of unanimity and criticizing the current Court for its lack
thereof); David 0. Stewart, A Chorus of Voices, 77 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (1991) (asking
whether concurring opinions should be seen as "useless carbuncles on the body
legal, permitting individual justices to indulge their egos, vent their spleen, and
give advisory opinions on issues not before the Court"); Linas E. Ledebur, Com-
ment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court, 113 PA.
ST. L. REV. 899, 901, 914-21 (2009) (arguing for the wholesale abolition of concur-
ring opinions on the Court).
4 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (collecting sources).
5 See Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 105
(stating that in an interview Roberts declared it "his priority ... to discourage his
colleagues from issuing separate opinions: 'I think that every justice should be
worried about the Court acting as a Court and functioning as a Court, and they
should all be worried, when they're writing separately, about the effect on the
Court as an institution.").
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The thesis of this Article is that the importance of concur-
ring opinions far exceeds the credit they get. Concurring opin-
ions are the pulse and compass of legal change. They let us
know what is happening below the surface of the law and signal
its direction. Law is never static; it is always in flux. Concur-
rences send important signals both about what the law actu-
ally is, and also what it can (or is unlikely to) become.
Concurrences, in their own vital way, help the legal world turn
round.
That is particularly true of a type of concurrence heretofore
unnoticed in case law or legal literature: the "pivotal" concur-
rence. Pivotal concurrences occur when one or more members
of a court majority also choose to write separately, undercut-
ting the majority's rule in the case. Under the Supreme Court's
"rule of five," pivotal concurrences are vestigial.6 Lower courts
ought to disregard them and adhere to the majority opinion.7
But in practice, that is hardly the case: pivotal concurrences
carry far more than their assigned weight.
Consider, if you will, the Supreme Court's "revolutionary"
5-4 decision in United States v. Lopez.8 In 1995 the Justices
shocked the legal world by striking down a federal statue for
the first time since the New Deal on the ground that it exceeded
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.9 Chief Justice
William Rehnquist assigned the opinion to himself, making
clear his approach represented a break from the path of consti-
tutional law to that point: "Admittedly, some of our prior cases
have taken long steps down th[e] road"10 "to converting] con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.... The broad
language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of ad-
ditional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any fur-
ther."1 1 Many read the decision as indicating a notable change
6 See infra subpart II.A.
7 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (stating that a rule
did not constitute binding precedent because it was contained in a concurrence).
8 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited
and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
752, 752 (1995) (describing the decision as "revolutionary").
9 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; see Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 128-29, 128 n.9 (describing
commentators' shock at the decision and noting that the last time the Court had
struck down a statute on these grounds was nearly sixty years earlier in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936)).
10 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
11 Id.
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in the balance of federal power. 1 2 Yet, five years later Glenn
Reynolds and Brannon Denning accurately characterized the
situation in the lower courts, asking, "What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?"13
Lopez's glancing impact should not have come as a sur-
prise to anyone who focused on the concurrence Justice
Anthony Kennedy authored on behalf of himself and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, two of the five Justices in the Lopez
majority. In it, Justice Kennedy said that the Court should
exercise "great restraint" before ever striking down an act of
Congress on Commerce Clause grounds.1 4 He called the hold-
ing "limited" and took pains to note that the Court's decision
did not overturn key rulings on the scope of the Commerce
Clause such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and
Katzenbach v. McClung.15
Lower courts often looked to the Kennedy concurrence to
limit Lopez's scope. It was cited over two thousand times in the
next eighteen years.16 In United States v. Wall, for example, the
Sixth Circuit considered a criminal defendant's challenge to the
constitutionality of Congress's criminalization of the ownership
of a "gambling business," on the theory that Congress had
exceeded its Commerce Clause powers under Lopez; the court
was not buying it (note the citation):
12 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce
Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (1996) ("[The Lopez Court's] abrupt
departure from established practice has turned a safe stronghold into a new
battleground for constitutional litigation."); Douglas W. Kmiec, Wising Up: Su-
preme Court Restores the Constitutional Structure, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 1995), http:/
/articles.chicagotribune.com/ 1995-05-02/news/9505020047 1-supreme-
court-constitutional-order-national-regulation [https://perma.cc/B5BN-J83D]
("Lopez is the first step in nearly 60 years toward the restoration of a constitu-
tional order premised upon a national government of enumerated and, therefore,
limited powers.").
13 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez,
or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?,
2000 WIS. L. REv. 369, 371 (finding that "lower courts have tended to limit Lopez
to its facts, rather than using it as a springboard to enforce a more robust theory
of federalism").
14 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 568, 573-74; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (holding that Congress was within its powers tinder the
Commerce Clause in enacting the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (holding
that Congress was within its powers under the Commerce Clause in extending the
public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restaurants
serving interstate travelers or serving food, a substantial portion of which has
moved in interstate commerce).
16 This figure was confirmed via the citing references tool on Westlaw.
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Until the Supreme Court provides a clearer signal or cogent
framework to handle this type of legislation, this court is
content to heed the concurrence of two Justices that the
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence still "counsels
great restraint." Lopez, - U.S. at _, 115 S. Ct. at 1634
(Kennedy, J. concurring). 1 7
In case you are nodding your head in agreement with what
the Sixth Circuit did, stop and think a moment. The vote in
Lopez was 5-4. The majority had spoken. As the Justices have
made clear repeatedly, five votes are the law and any opinion
garnering those votes is to govern. Only when there is no clear
majority might a concurrence carry weight.1 8 But that was not
the case here. So why was anyone following Justice Kennedy's
lead, rather than the Chief Justice's? Dissenting in Wall,
Judge Danny Boggs made just this point:
It must be stressed, however, that Lopez is not a plurality
opinion, with a majority merely concurring in the result that
the statute is unconstitutional. Both Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor fully endorsed the majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Therefore, I read the Kennedy-
O'Connor concurrence to sound a note of caution about the
scope of Lopez, not a note of paralysis. 19
As we demonstrate (by analyzing a dataset we created for
these purposes), the nature of the lower courts' reaction to
Kennedy's pivotal concurrence in Lopez is not unusual. Pivotal
concurrences are more common than one might think, are be-
coming yet more so, and-despite the Supreme Court's admo-
nition to the contrary-lower courts take pivotal concurrences
quite seriously.
The central point here is that concurrences-particularly
pivotal concurrences-are a crucial and understudied feature
of our legal landscape. Rather than the excess verbiage of
judges who cannot control the need to speak separately, at the
expense of the clarity and authority of the law, they are essen-
tial beacons and harbingers of legal stasis and legal change
alike. They signal to litigants and lawyers where there are pos-
sibilities for movement in the law, and where there are not,
which issues to bring to court and which to avoid.
The important role concurrences play is even more instruc-
tive given that they hardly are an essential part of a legal sys-
17 United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1452 (6th Cir. 1996).
18 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977). The Marks rule is
discussed more extensively below in section II.A.2.
19 Wall, 92 F.3d at 1455 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tem. To the contrary, separate opinions are prohibited in many
parts of the globe.20 Even in the United States, they were a rare
occurrence for many years after the Founding, coming into
their own only in the early twentieth century during an era of
great legal turmoil. 2 1 Again, this late birth of frequent separate
opinions was no accident-it was an essential part of the pro-
cess of rapid legal change. To this day, separate opinions-
particularly pivotal concurrences-signal when the law is ripe
for movement. Thus, instead of ignoring or condemning con-
currences, we should be endeavoring to understand what func-
tion they serve, and why they get written when they do. That is
the point of this Article.
Part I draws from practices of courts around the globe to
explain the tradeoffs involved in the decision to permit or pro-
hibit separate opinions. These examples show how allowing
concurring and dissenting opinions provides a certain amount
of judicial transparency, at the cost of clarity and judicial au-
thority. For most of its first one hundred plus years, the Su-
preme Court of the United States leaned much more toward
clarity and authority, but by 1941 that system of restraint had
gone by the boards. Separate opinions became business as
usual. Why, precisely, this was the case, however, has re-
mained unclear.
In Part II we begin to look for an answer to the role of
separate opinions-and particularly concurrences-by focus-
ing on the lower courts' decisions to follow such opinions. The
Supreme Court of the United States has indicated quite clearly
what lower courts are to do with concurrences: ignore them,
except in the rare case in which a court is so fractured that
there is no majority opinion. 22 Courts are to follow precedent,
not engage in guesswork as to where the law is headed. Yet, as
we show by analyzing a novel database of Supreme Court con-
currences and all lower court citations to them between 1946
and 2012, lower courts do not follow instructions. Instead,
they cite and discuss pivotal concurrences at much higher
rates than they do for non-pivotal concurrences, even after
controlling for other factors. In short, the lower courts think
there is something valuable going on in certain concurring
opinions, so much so that they appear to consult them for
direction even when told they have no formal precedential
value.
20 See infra section I.A. 1.
21 See infra subpart I.B.
22 See infra subpart II.A.
2018]1 823
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Part III then returns to the history of the growth of separate
opinions in the early 1900s to offer a hypothesis about what
motivated their rise, and what that rise says about the impor-
tance of pivotal concurrences. This was the period when the
Supreme Court fractured in the face of monumental legal chal-
lenges to legislation adopted to ameliorate and manage the
effects of the Industrial Revolution. During the troubled de-
cades of the early twentieth century, concluding with President
Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court in
1936, the Justices abandoned an internal (and largely un-
known until unearthed by political scientists) "norm of consen-
sus."2 3 Which is to say, until the early 1900s, the Justices
intentionally suppressed disagreement among themselves,
keeping it from public view to bolster the clarity of the law and
the authority of the Court itself. But the issues that confronted
the Justices in the early 1900s were so important that dissent
no longer could be suppressed, and liberal and conservative
voting blocs burst into public on the Court.
The fracturing of the Court in the early 1900s occurred in
salient, constitutional cases.24 In these cases, the Justices
concluded, it was important to let the world know where the
fault lines among them rested, in part to drive litigation to the
Court to move the law, and in part to signal the need for social
change. This phenomenon persists to the present day. In sali-
ent cases-particularly constitutional ones-when the Su-
preme Court fractures, the lower courts take notice. Rather
than simply following majority opinions, as the Justices have
told them to, they work hard to read the tea leaves, focusing
closely on concurrences as their guide to the future.
We conclude, normatively, by bucking common wisdom.
There is, we argue, beauty in a fractured court. Precisely in
those cases that are most high-stakes and most contentious, it
is important that the Justices reveal their individual views.
Because, revealed or not, those are the views that will govern
the decision of later cases. Displaying those views publicly
sends essential signals to litigants and lawyers about where
legal change is possible, and where it is not, helping both to
temper expectations and to move the law itself.
23 See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consen-
sus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SC. 362, 362, 366 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Epstein et al., Norm of Consensus]; infra note 195 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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I
THE CHOICE To ALLOw SEPARATE OPINIONS
All court systems must make a fundamental decision
whether to allow dissenting and concurring opinions. In sepa-
rate articles on the opinion-writing practices of the Canadian
and United States Supreme Courts, Peter McCormick and Todd
Henderson make the point that opinion-writing practices are
not "random" or "neutral": they betray "an understanding by
the members of the court of their role."25 Historically, courts
around the globe have varied considerably in their amenability
to separate concurrences and dissents. Subpart L.A looks to
global "per curiam" and "seriatim" systems for information as to
why one might favor separate opinions or suppress them. Sub-
part I.B then describes how the United States evolved in its
own somewhat unique way, with one opinion denominated that
of "the Court," surrounded by separate opinions. Subpart I.C
puts the point sharply: why, in the United States, do we toler-
ate concurrences, which do not exist under per curiam and
seriatim systems, and which are widely condemned even here?
A. Per Curian, Seriatim, and Hybrid Courts
1. Per Curiam Courts
In many countries, particularly those with a civil law tradi-
tion, separate opinions are not allowed. Courts speak "per
curianm," 26 with one and only one voice: there are no concur-
rences and no dissents. This, for example, is the practice in
France and Italy; many European constitutional courts operate
similarly. 2 7
25 Peter McCormick, Structures of Judgment: How the Modem Supreme Court
of Canada Organizes Its Reasons, 32 DALHOUSIE L.J. 35, 41 (2009); accord M. Todd
Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent,
2007 Sup. CT. REv. 283, 285-86 (concluding that how the Supreme Court com-
municates its decisions reflects the Court's power and therefore depends upon the
Court's goals).
26 In the United States, courts use the phrase "per curian to refer to opinions
that are signed not by one judge but by the entire court. We mean something
slightly less formal: an opinion is per curam for our purposes to the extent it is the
sole opinion in a case, unaccompanied by dissent or concurrence.
27 See Rosa Raffaelli, Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Mem-
ber States, at 18-19, Pol'y Dept. C, Citizens' Rights and Const'l Affairs, PE
462.470 (Nov. 2012) (describing the practices of European courts with policies of
strict suppression). In Italian courts, dissents may be recorded, along with their
justifications, but those dissents are sealed and are not made available to the
public. Id. at 18. For a more detailed discussion of the Italian judiciary, see
generally THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CoURT 51 (Servizio Studi & Ufficio Stampa
eds., Clare Tame trans., 4th ed. 2002). In the European Union, the rule of per
curiam opinions is also followed in Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
2018]1 825
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Separate opinions in these jurisdictions are suppressed in
part as a matter of tradition. In France, for example, judicial
bodies spoke for the king, the roi de justice, who could only
exercise one will-and thus but one voice. 28 Suppression also
is more compatible with the broader civilian tradition, in which
judges (ostensibly) do not make but merely apply codified
law.29
Today, however, the suppression of separate opinions is
justified primarily as enhancing the authority or legitimacy of
the court and the clarity of its rulings. Single opinions of the
European Court of Justice, for example, are "defended on the
ground of the need to build up the court's authority by present-
ing a united front and as a defence against political pres-
sure."3 0 The Italian Constitutional Court considered allowing
anonymous dissents, but rejected the idea because it
presented "too pluralistic a view of the Constitution."3 1 Others
express concern that dissenting opinions might "undermin[e]
the authority of the decisions of the Court" and provide "a
reduced incentive for judges to seek the broadest possible
consensus."32
Suppressing separate opinions keeps the focus on the
court as an institution. It is sometimes said that in systems
allowing for separate opinions-particularly the United
States-there is a cult of personality surrounding certain indi-
vidual judges.33 This phenomenon, it is argued, fuels a circle
and Austria. Raffaelli, supra, at 17, 19-20. See generally Pasquale Pasquino,
European Constitutional Courts and USSC: Some Differences (Nov. 1, 2007) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pasquino, European Con-
stitutional Courts] (contrasting judicial review as it exists in continental Europe
with the practice in the United States).
28 Pasquino, European Constitutional Courts, supra note 27, at 8.
29 See McCormick, supra note 25, at 40 (explaining that civilian codes are
understood to be objective, that judges are expected simply to apply the code to
the facts, and that judicial decisions are not supposed to have precedential value
in the same or lower courts).
30 Alan Redfern, Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration:
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT'L 223, 232, n.48 (2004) (quoting John
Alder, Dissents in Courts ofLast Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
221, 234 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons
from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1671, 1696 (2004); see Michele Taruffo & Massimo
La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 141,
145 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (noting disagreement
among scholars over the virtues of permitting dissenting and concurring
opinions).
32 THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 27, at 51.
3 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 31, at 1672-73, 1697 (contrasting
European judges, who are "not able to develop ideologically distinct public per-
sonalities" with Justice Antonin Scalia, who, through "strident dissent[s]" sought
826 [Vol. 103:817
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in which judges feed their public persona by writing more sepa-
rate opinions. If judges cannot write separately, they remain in
the background, and the court's opinions stay in the
foreground.
2. Seriatim Courts
In sharp contrast to per curiam systems, Commonwealth
countries-e.g., New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and In-
dia-traditionally wrote opinions seriatim.3 4 Under that prac-
tice, each judge is expected to produce her own opinion
disposing of the case before the court.3 5 Once the opinions are
published, one reads them all to determine the "holding" from
the locus of authority among the individual opinions.3 6 The
seriatim system has the advantage of providing more fine-
grained information about each judge's view of the law, but at
the cost of an easily identified holding embodied in a single
opinion for the court.
No one seems to know precisely why seriatim opinion writ-
ing became the practice, but it is justified-and has at times
been expected-for reasons of transparency and judicial ac-
countability.3 7 Thomas Jefferson, who favored the practice
and deplored John Marshall for eliminating it on the United
States Supreme Court, called judges "lazy or timid" for failing
to "persuade the public, or parts of it, as much as he [did] his fellow Justices"); see
also THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL Couir, supra note 27, at 51 (noting that allowing
dissenting opinions may lead to "excessive 'personalization' of constitutional judg-
ments"); John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Su-
preme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 159-61, 170-71 (1999) (noting
that developments during the Taney Court contributed to a focus on the views of
individual Justices).
34 Edward McWhinney, Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A Comparative
View of Opinion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals, 31 CAN. B. REv. 595, 601-09
(1953). But see id. at 607-08 (noting that the Irish Supreme Court had only once,
since 1937, failed to deliver a single opinion for the court); Kurt H. Nadelmann,
The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 416 (1959) ("In
the Irish Republic, no dissent may be announced . .. in cases where the Supreme
Court decides a question involving the constitutional validity of a law.").
35 Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 8 n.1.
36 See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND
INDIVIDUAL STYLES 10 (2007) (describing locating a majority opinion as a "col-
laborat[ion]" between bench and bar "to reach a decision based on their efforts to
apply legal principle (the common law) to the individual case"); see Henderson,
supra note 25, at 292-93 (noting that the sum of the separate opinions "would
amount to the legal rule in the case").
37 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 293-94. Henderson notes that although
the origins of seriatim practice are unknown, the separate oral delivery of each
judge's opinion may reduce the appearance and perhaps the incidence of corrup-
tion or collusion, and may hold each judge accountable, providing an incentive to
work hard. Id.
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to express their own views.38 As quaint as the practice may
seem today-and, as we will see, there is evidence it is falling
out of favor in some respects globally-it had something going
for it intellectually. On a seriatim court judges do not deliber-
ate formally; they read, listen, think-and then write indepen-
dently.3 9 Thus, precedent is particularly weighty, because it
represents a consensus independently reached. 40
3. The Tension
These systems represent polar opposites, and the choice
between them entails significant tradeoffs. Seriatim systems
are transparent, but at the cost of notable loss of clarity.4 1 Per
curiam systems have clarity and authority in abundance, but
do not reveal what is going on in each judge's mind. 42 Thus,
even within each system there have been those who advocated
moving toward the other, particularly when the need to capture
one set of values was particularly compelling.43
The United Kingdom has long felt the tension, abandoning
its seriatim tradition when circumstances warranted. Lord
Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, did away
with seriatim judgments during the late eighteenth century,
particularly in commercial cases. 44 As Mansfield (or rather,
conspicuously, "the Court") stated in Milles v. Fletcher, "The
great object in every branch of law, but especially in mercantile
38 Alder, supra note 30, at 238; see also McWhinney, supra note 34, at 609
("Jefferson thought that there should be a rule requiring the judges to announce
seriatim their opinions in each case .. . .").
39 See McCormick, supra note 25, at 38 (describing seriatim decision as "the
practice whereby every member of a multi-judge appeal panel delivers a full free-
standing set of reasons, each writing as if nobody else were doing so, their 'votes'
for and against the appeal being totalled to generate an outcome").
40 Cf. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xix-xx (2005) ("Paradoxically,
the best way for a group to be smart is for each person in it to think and act as
independently as possible.").
41 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 298-99 (arguing that "seriatim opinions
add[ I a layer of confusion" because they lack "binary win-loss character," making
it more difficult to ascertain the rule of the case, and to determine the strength of
precedent).
42 David Currie notes that although per curiam opinion writing may "strike us
as both tidier and more powerful . . . seriatim opinions actually may give us a
better basis for predicting later decisions." DAvID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTILTION IN
THE SUPREME COuRT 14 n.61 (1985).
43 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Writing Separately, 65 WASH.
L. REV. 133, 133 (1990) (noting that some in the civil law world have come to
support separate opinions, and that judges in the United States may learn from
jurists abroad to exercise greater restraint before writing separately).
44 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 294.
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law, is certainty."45 The Privy Council, which gave advice to the
King on legal questions from the colonies, also spoke with one
voice. 46 "There were 'policy considerations in the heyday of
Imperial power which dictated a clear pronouncement for sub-
ject peoples not attuned to the institutions and conventions of
their Imperial masters.'"47 For related reasons, the intermedi-
ate criminal courts in the U.K. did not issue separate opinions:
'To the criminal, punishment itself is bitter enough, without
the salt of a favourable but impotent dissenting judgment being
rubbed into the wound."4 8
Even in these eddies of per curiam practice, however, there
remained pressure to revert to seriatim treatment. Today in the
U.K., dissents are allowed in intermediate criminal appeals,
albeit only with the permission of the presiding judge.4 9 Simi-
larly, the Privy Council, too, decided in 1966 to allow no more
than one dissent, a practice that has been termed perhaps the
worst of all worlds.50
Australia also has moved toward consensus. Informal con-
ferencing among the justices of the Australian High Court was
encouraged, and then-beginning in 1998-Chief Justice
Gleeson held formal conferences. 5 1 This practice may have
paved the way for a period of unprecedented unity on the High
Court, from 2009 through 2011, following the ascension of
45 Milles v. Fletcher [1779] 99 Eng. Rep. 151, 152. See generally Henderson,
supra note 25, at 295. Because plaintiffs had significant liberty to select a fo-
rum-and because judges were paid by the case-Mansfield's switch from seria-
tim to per curiam was also a bid for relevance in a competitive and fast-changing
legal market. Henderson, supra note 25, at 296-98; accord Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1189 (2007) (describing contemporary competition among judges, for fees,
which were a "significant component[ ] of total judicial income").
46 See McWhinney, supra note 34, at 599 ("In theory, since the Judicial
Committee [of the Privy Council], as they themselves noted, only 'advise' the
Crown, they must present united counsel to the Crown .. . .").
47 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 135 (quoting Louis BLOM-COOPER & GAVIN
DREWRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACHIY 82
(1972)).
48 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 135 (quoting BLOM-COOPER & DREWRY, supra
note 47, at 81).
49 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 135.
50 Alder, supra note 30, at 235.
51 See Michael Kirby, Justice of the High Court of Austl., Ten Years in the
High Court-Continuity and Change 26 (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.hcourt.gov
.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-ustices/kirbyj /kirbyj_1005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FE7U-4GGC] (describing Gleeson's practice of holding confer-
ences after "virtually every case" to discuss "issues and tentative impressions");
see also Andrew Lynch, The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical
Analysis of Its First Five Years, 26 UNSW L.J. 32, 49 n.57 (2003) (noting that
informal conferencing between justices did take place prior to Gleeson's arrival).
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Gleeson's successor Chief Justice Robert French in 2008 (and
the corresponding departure of Judge Michael Kirby, Austra-
lia's "Great Dissenter"). 52 In that period, the High Court de-
cided almost half its cases by issuing one joint opinion.5 3
There was a bit of a reversal in 2011; the High Court reached
consensus less than 17% of the time that year. 54 Still, the rate
of dissent continued to decline, with just under a third of cases
receiving any dissenting opinion in 2012.55
Conversely, courts that traditionally suppress opinions
have demonstrated some tolerance for dissent. The German
Constitutional Court first allowed dissenting opinions, or
sondervotum, in 1970, though they are still rare in practice.56
The German Court, in turn, served as a model for current con-
stitutional courts in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Croatia.5 7 Dissent is now permitted, in various forms, in
many countries that have been influenced by the Anglo-Ameri-
can judicial system, including India, Pakistan, and Israel.58
China, which until recently issued only short and conclusory
opinions, recently acted to permit dissenting opinions in cer-
tain situations. 59
Even on courts that still adhere to a strict system of una-
nimity, there are other ways to ensure that contrary views are
expressed. The judges of the Italian Constitutional Court
speak with one voice,60 but the opinion itself is published in the
academic journal Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, accompanied
52 Andrew Lynch, By Nature, High Court Judges Are Seldom in Agreement,
AUSTRALiAN (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-af
fairs/by-nature-high-court-udges-are-seldom-in-agreement/news-story/8ee78e
fbbcal76b726eac82ed559ddc2 [https://perma.cc/X6DS-EKYE] [hereinafter
Lynch, By Nature].
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Andrew Lynch & George Williams, The High Court on Constitutional Law:
The 2012 Statistics, 36 UNSW L.J. 514, 515 tbl.A (2013).
56 Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 22 (noting that although dissenting opinions
were initially used extensively, by 2012 they were utilized in only 6% of cases); see
also The Gavel and the Robe, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1999, at 33, 34 (describing
Germany's approach, which allows a "tally of votes cast and dissenting opinions
to be published alongside the court's judgment").
57 Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, 8 JURIDICA
INT'L 162, 165 (2003).
58 Id.
59 H.E. Wan Exiang, Vice President of the Supreme People's Court of China,
Judicial Reform in China, Latest Developments and Potential Challenges: Re-
marks (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.oas.org/en/media-center/speech.asp?sCodi
go=07-0115 [https://perma.cc/LV34-63LY].
60 THE ITALIAN CONsTITUTIoNAL CoURT, supra note 27, at 50-51 (noting that
there is no official means of knowing whether a decision is unanimous, nor how
individual judges voted).
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by critical commentary by academics and interested third par-
ties.6 1 Similarly, the European Court of Justice issues only one
opinion, but it publishes the views of the Advocate General,
which may stand in for separate opinions by expressing con-
trary arguments. 62
B. The "Customary Middle Way": The Practice of the
United States Supreme Court
In contrast with systems that struggled to accommodate
competing values, the Supreme Court of the United States
early on settled into its own unique hybrid. There is always an
opinion "for the Court." And yet, separate views are permitted
as well. In this way, the authority and clarity of the judgment
are obtained, while still allowing for transparency. In 1990,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg referred to this as the "customary
middle way."63
For well over one hundred years, this middle way tilted
heavily toward consensus. And then, sometime in the late
1930s, that longtime equilibrium collapsed. Something hap-
pened. Not only did separate opinions become common, but we
saw the emergence of opinions opposing the majority on behalf
of a "bloc" of Justices.64 This was (and remains) a sharp devia-
tion from practices elsewhere around the world.
1. The Early Years
The Supreme Court originally adhered to the English seria-
tim tradition.6 5 But John Marshall changed that.6 6 He per-
suaded his colleagues to follow the lead of the Virginia Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Edmund Pendleton, who had imported
Mansfield's practice of issuing one opinion for the Court. 67
61 Pasquino, European Constitutional Courts, supra note 27, at 10-11.
62 Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 33-35 (noting disagreement among scholars as
to whether the Advocate General's views serve as an effective substitute for sepa-
rate opinions).
63 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 149.
64 The emergence of voting blocs on the Court is discussed supra section
I.B.2.
65 Alder, supra note 30, at 238.
66 SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 20 (Scott Douglas
Gerber ed., 1998). In truth, publishing an opinion of the Court was a burgeoning
practice in the pre-Marshall Court, with such opinions constituting at least half of
all opinions between 1794 and 1799. POPKIN. supra note 36, at 62-63. This
practice was consolidated under Chief Justice Marshall, however. Herbert A.
Johnson, Judicial Institutions in Emerging Federal Systems: The Marshall Court
and the European Court of Justice, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2000).
67 Henderson, supra note 25, at 304, 313-14; McWhinney, supra note 34, at
609.
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Marshall sacrificed his own views to entrench the practice,
suppressing his own disagreement even in opinions he au-
thored for the Court.6 8 Marshall expressed his preference for
speaking with one voice in an article he published pseudony-
mously in a Philadelphia newspaper in 1819, a response to
criticism of his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland69 :
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the
opinion which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is
previously submitted to the consideration of all the judges;
and, if any part of the reasoning be disapproved, it must be
so modified as to receive the approbation of all, before it can
be delivered as the opinion of all.7 0
President Jefferson deplored the practice of delivering one
opinion of the Court, writing, "An opinion is huddled up in a
conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unani-
mous ... by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to
his mind, by the turn of his own reasoning."7 1 He appointed a
man after his own beliefs, William Johnson, to the Court.72
But despite Johnson's efforts, until 1823 no other Justice had
written more than eight separate opinions, concurring or dis-
senting.7 3 Between 1805 and 1822 there were only twenty-four
concurrences total, twelve of which were written by Johnson
himself. 7 4 Writing to Jefferson in 1822, Johnson recounted his
68 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 316 ("Although Marshall dissented occa-
sionally, he generally led by example and acquiesced to the compromise posi-
tion."); Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 10 WM. & MARY Q.
353, 369 (1953) (quoting Justice Johnson who wrote he was not surprised to see
Marshall "delivering all the opinions in cases in which he sat, even in some
instances when contrary to his own judgment and vote"); see also id. at 356-63
(detailing Marshall's pursuit of harmony and unity on the Court regardless of any
private disagreements among the Justices).
69 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
70 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 320 (1919). He was
responding to criticism published by his arch-enemy, Spencer Roane, a Justice of
the Virginia Court of Appeals. For historical context, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE 82-83 (2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE].
71 Morgan, supra note 68, at 358 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175,
177-78 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904)). Jefferson's complaints were echoed most
enthusiastically by Virginia's Judge Roane, who wrote under pseudonym to at-
tack the Court's Republican judges, including Johnson, for their apparent com-
plicity with the Federalist agenda. Morgan, supra note 68, at 357-58.
72 Morgan, supra note 68, at 353-54 (noting that Johnson "spearheaded" the
Jeffersonian "movement for free expression" in the form of dissents); accord Hen-
derson, supra note 25, at 317-18 (noting that although dissents were somewhat
successful at breaking Marshall's grip on the court, there was still only approxi-
mately one dissent for every twenty-five decisions during this period).
73 Morgan, supra note 68, at 363 & n.35.
74 Id. at 366 & n.48.
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struggles beginning with his 1805 concurrence in Huidekoper's
Lessee v. Douglass75 :
Some case soon occurred, in which I differed from my breth-
ren, [and] I thought it a thing of course to deliver my opinion.
But, during the rest of the session I heard nothing but lec-
tures on the indecency of judges cutting at each other, and
the loss of reputation which the Virginia appellate court had
sustained by pursuing such a course. At length I found that I
must either submit to circumstances or become such a cy-
pher in our consultations as to effect no good at all.7 6
Under Marshall's successors, separate opinions became
somewhat more frequent, though they were still a relative rar-
ity. From the Marshall Court until the Hughes Court (begin-
ning in 1930), the ratio of separate opinions to majority
opinions was roughly 10%.77 This ratio ranged from a high of
18% on the Taney Court to a low of 7% in the White Court,78
but even the 18% high-water mark of the Taney Court falls well
below the modem rate of separate opinions, which has aver-
aged around 50% in recent years.79
Moreover, throughout this time, separate opinions had lit-
tle impact, in part because-until the turn of the twentieth
century-they were (for the most part) just that: a Justice writ-
ing on his own.8 0 Ideological blocs, which today manifest
themselves in a principal majority opinion accompanied by a
principal dissent, were infrequent.8 '
75 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805).
76 Morgan, supra note 68, at 369.
77 That is, the number of separate opinions divided by the total number of
opinions for the court, excluding per curtam opinions and dissents and concur-
rences without an opinion. Kelsh, supra note 33, at 176-77 nn.238-39 & chart B.
78 Kelsh, supra note 33, at 177.
79 See infra Figure 1.
80 Kelsh, supra note 33, at 166-69. The handful of Justices who penned
many of the early dissents (Johnson, Daniel, Clifford, and Harlan) "nearly always
wrote only for themselves" and were each the "dominant dissenter of their times."
Id. at 169.
81 Justices did, in fact, begin dissenting in blocs far before the twentieth
century, although the practice was relatively rare. During the Taney Court, for
example, Justices dissented in three- and four-Justice blocs in all but four years
of Chief Justice Taney's twenty-eight-year tenure. Susan Navarro Smelcer, The
Evolution of Dissent in the United States Supreme Court 94 fig.3.9 (2015) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on fie with authors). Of the 229
cases in which at least one Justice dissented and offered a rationale (of the 1,667
decided during Taney's tenure), 177 (78.3%) were solo authored, 25 (11.1%) were
joined by one Justice, 18 (8.0%) were joined by two Justices, and 6 (2.7%) were
joined by three Justices. Id. at 91.
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2. The Breach
Then, this relative unity collapsed.
At some point in the first half of the twentieth century, the
opinion writing practices of the Justices of the Supreme Court
shifted dramatically. This change is clearly visible in Figure 1,
which plots concurring and dissenting opinions as a percent-
age of all Supreme Court decisions from 1800 through 2015.82
FIGURE 1. RATES OF DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINIONS
7 2
oww
In Figure 1, 1941 jumps out.83 Before 1941 there were an
average of 8.5 dissenting opinions for each one hundred major-
ity opinions; after that date the number jumped to seventy-
three. 4 Although it is less sharp, concurrences show a similar
jump.
Moreover, as ground-breaking work by Herman Pritchett
showed in 1948, the Justices had begun to vote in blocs.8 5
Pritchett began to catalog those voting blocs, by demonstrating
the patterns of agreement among the Justices. Table 1, for
82 These data were collected from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 252 tbl.3-2, 258 tbl.3-3 (6th ed.
2015) and THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ [https://
perma.cc/7LRF-DG6Z].
83 See Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious
Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361,
363-64 (1988) ("[Clonsensus norms did not gradually erode, but were abruptly
shattered [during the 1941 term].").
84 Averages calculated from data provided in EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 82, at 252 tbl.3-2, 258 tbl.3-3.
85 See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 23-45 (First Quadrangle
1969) (1948) (explaining how the Court had fractured into liberal and conservative
blocs leading up to 1941).
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example, is Pritchett's summary of the 1939 and 1940 Terms 86 :
(We have added dark lines to make clearer the bloc structure.)
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS AMONG SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES IN CONTROVERSIAL CASES, 1939 AND 1940
TERMS (IN PERCENTAGES)
Justice McReynolds Roberts Hughes Stone Reed Frankfurter Murphy Black Douglas
McReynolds - 64 64 41 35 31 38 24 24
Roberts 64 - 75 51 45 45 39 37 36
Hughes 64 75 - 78 63 64 53 49 49
Stone 41 51 78 - 81 84 75 69 69
Reed 35 45 63 81 - 86 80 79 79
Frankfurter 31 45 64 84 86 - 91 85 84
Murphy 38 39 53 75 80 91 - 89 89
Black 24 37 49 69 79 85 89 - 100
Douglas 24 36 49 68 79 84 89 100 -
3. Return to the Seriatim Court?
The phenomenon that burst into public view in 1941 gath-
ered speed in the ensuing years as separate concurrences be-
came frequent as well. In sharp contrast to the Supreme Court
in the early 1900s, the Justices were unanimous during Octo-
ber Term 2014 only 40% of the time. Concurrences rose
sharply in the 1960s; today they continue to hover between
40% and 50% (see Figure 1 above).8 7
This change in opinion writing practices has led some to
suggest the Supreme Court had returned to its seriatim opinion
writing habits of old. In 1957, Bernard Schwartz remarked of
the growing trend that "[1]f carried to its extreme, the right to
concur or dissent leads back ... to the practice of . .. seriatim
opinions."8 8 In a piece on opinion writing published in 1990,
Justice Ginsburg asked:
Has our Supreme Court drifted from its once customary mid-
dle way-an opinion for the court sometimes accompanied by
a separate opinion-toward the Law Lords' pattern of seria-
tim opinions, each carrying equal weight .. .?9
86 C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 894 tbls.6, 7 (1941).
87 See EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 82, at 258
tbl.3-3.
88 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN RET-
ROSPECT 356-57 (1957).
89 Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 149.
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Perhaps most important, our current Chief Justice, who has
sought greater unanimity, has asked the same: "[N]owadays,
you take a look at some of our opinions and you wonder if we're
reverting back to the English model, where everybody has to
have their say."9 0
C. Why Concurrences?
These expressions of concern about the fracturing of the
Court raise the question of why we allow concurring opinions.
What function do they serve? They do not exist at all in per
curian systems; even when dissent is permitted to some de-
gree, concurrences are non-existent. And, strictly speaking,
concurrences do not exist in seriatim systems either. It is true
that in sertatim systems each justice writes separately, but that
only underscores the point: no opinion is, strictly speaking, a
"concurrence." Concurrences are the particular curiosity of
the United States' hybrid middle way. Ajudge who agrees with
the Court's resolution of a case, still feels the need to (and is
permitted to) express his or her own views as to the rationale.
Perhaps concurrences are the accidental by-product of Chief
Justice John Marshall's pushing the Supreme Court from a
seriatim practice to consensus: it might have seemed a step too
far to bar other Justices from writing altogether. But that
hardly explains the persistence of the practice, and its explo-
sion in the twentieth century.
Everyone seems to understand dissents. They are a princi-
pled call for change, an insistence that all is not right. A dis-
senting opinion will not alter the doctrine now, but it might
attract adherents in the future.9 1 Think, for example, of Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan's solo opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,
decrying the doctrine of separate but equal. 92 He was outvoted
90 Rosen, supra note 5, at 106.
91 See Cardozo, supra note 2, at 49 ("The dissenter speaks to the future, and
his voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the years."); Henderson, supra
note 25, at 340-41 ("[D]issent allows lower courts, lawyers, and politicians to
measure the weight of the opinion and to plan a political or legal counterat-
tack.. .. Dissent undermines the force of an opinion, and allows opponents to
hope for the day when they will control the Court."); Robert Post, The Supreme
Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decision-
making in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1347 (2001) (noting that although
dissent cannot alter the "binding and dispositive force of the Court's judgment on
the parties before it," strong dissents may have a significant impact on the public);
Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 15 ("Dissents can thus play an essential role in the
future development of the law: in some cases, they may eventually become the
majority opinion, or influence it.").
92 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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8-1, but the loneliness of his voice over time served only to
underscore the moral clarity of the position for which he ar-
gued. The importance of dissenting has been acknowledged
worldwide, even where the strong norm of consensus
controls.9 3
But what conceivably explains concurrences? Even in
places that have allowed dissent, concurrences remain off the
table. And there are compelling reasons why. Concurrences
destroy the clarity and authority of a majority opinion, without
adding the principled disagreement of a dissent. Compared
with dissents, concurrences appear as judicial sour grapes. "If
the opinion had been assigned to me," the concurring judge
can appear to write, "I'd have written it differently."
That is why, even in the United States, which allows con-
currences, a common complaint is that fracturing the rationale
in a case undermines the Court's credibility. Chief Justice
Roberts justified his search for greater harmony: "If the Court
in Marshall's era had issued decisions in important cases the
way this Court has over the past thirty years, we would not
have a Supreme Court today of the sort that we have."94
An even stronger argument against concurrences, and the
more common one today, is that they destroy legal clarity.95
Relatively few dissents turn into majority opinions.9 6 On the
other hand, the more fractured the Court is as to the ratio
decidendi, the more difficult it is to know what the law is.
Commentators are virtually uniform in contempt for concur-
rences on this score.97 But since the late 1960s, concurrences
93 See, e.g., Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 12 (noting that dissents have been
permitted in both civil law and common law countries).
94 Rosen, supra note 5, at 105.
95 See Andrew Lynch, Dissent: The Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagree-
ment in the High Court ofAustralia, 27 MELB. U. L. REv. 724, 750 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Lynch, Rewards].
96 Raffaelli, supra note 27, at 15 ("[M]ost dissenting opinions never find their
way into a subsequent final judgment.").
97 See Alder, supra note 30, at 240 ("Concurring speeches where the same
outcome is reached by different routes raise some of the same issues as dissents
and indeed may create more serious technical problems in relation to legal cer-
tainty."); Berkolow, supra note 3, at 354 (noting that when the Court speaks with
one voice, it can "assure clarity of the law, which provides guidance to the legal
community, predictability and stability" and that writing separately undermines
this); Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 148 ("More unsettling than the high incidence of
dissent is the proliferation of separate opinions with no single opinion command-
ing a clear majority"); Lynch, Rewards, supra note 95, at 750 ("A profusion of
substantially similar concurring opinions serves less purpose than a clear state-
ment of dissent and is more harmful to the coherence of the law that the court
lays down."); McWhinney, supra note 34, at 614 ("Critics of the practice of the
United States Supreme Court in opinion-writing since 1937 point to a diminution
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have only become more frequent, much like the dissents have
since the 1940s. Why?
II
THE PECULIAR STATUS OF CONCURRENCES
Concurring opinions not only muddy the law and under-
mine the authority of the Court; they also put lower courts in
an impossible bind. If the Justices offer different rationales,
and if in doing so indicate that the law is headed in a direction
other than that indicated by the majority opinion, must the
lower court still follow the majority opinion at the risk of rever-
sal, or can it follow the concurrence? Subpart II.A explains
how lower courts get trapped between adhering to a majority
opinion, though they know they will be overruled, or ignoring
"precedent" in favor of a "prediction" as to what the higher
court will say. The Supreme Court ostensibly has adopted a
"do as I say not as I do" posture, effectively instructing lower
courts to ignore most of the concurrences the Justices con-
tinue to write. Subpart II.B offers a new taxonomy of concur-
rences to indicate in which cases the lower courts face this
tension most acutely. We distinguish "pivotal," "plurality," and
"vanilla" concurrences, with pivotal concurrences being the
real culprit. Then, in subpart II.C, we underscore the depth of
the tension lower courts face by showing that lower courts cite
surprisingly often to pivotal concurrences, despite the Su-
preme Court's indication that they have no weight. We do this
using a database we created of citations to Supreme Court
concurrences written between 1946 and 2012.
A. The Dilemma for Lower Courts
To understand the problem of concurrences for lower court
judges, put yourself in the position of a federal court of appeals
judge. It is common wisdom that lower courts do not like to be
reversed. The obvious way to avoid reversal is to follow binding
Supreme Court precedent. But suppose that, despite what
precedent tells you, you believe the Court itself is likely to fol-
low not the majority opinion in a prior case, but a decisive
concurring opinion written by a swing Justice. At that point
you are between a rock and a hard place. Should you follow the
majority opinion, anticipating reversal? Or should you buck
in the value ofjudicial precedent as a guide to future decisions, and a consequent
increase in the problems of the business man and of the lawyer who must advise
him.").
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the majority opinion in favor of the concurrence and avoid re-
versal-while at the same time awarding victory to the side that
ultimately will prove to have deserved it?
Although the Supreme Court has never spoken directly to
this issue, the Court's answers to related questions indicate its
view that lower courts should follow the majority opinion, de-
spite whatever writing might be on the wall. In the balance of
this Part we make the case that lower courts must follow bind-
ing precedent and ignore concurring opinions, even if they are
sure they will be reversed.
1. The Rule of Five
It is an essential feature of common law collegial courts,
including nearly every court in the United States, that a deci-
sion by majority vote is binding.9 8 Litigants in an individual
case are of course bound by the voting with respect to the
judgment or the disposition of the case-affirm, reverse, va-
cate. But to what extent does majority rule extend beyond the
judgment to the holding or rationale for a particular case?99
This question is particularly critical for courts like the Supreme
Court that have discretionary dockets, because they review
only a small fraction of the cases decided by the lower courts
they supervise. 1 00 The question is surprisingly unexamined,
both in the literature and by the Supreme Court itself, but a
pretty definitive answer can be inferred from what has been
said on related issues. 101
As a practical matter, garnering five votes for an opinion is
critical. Justice Brennan was fond of teaching his law clerks,
98 See Waldron, supra note 1, at 1698 ("And in the United States, the fact that
courts use [majority decision] is the crucial assumption on which the whole polit-
ics of judicial appointments turns.").
99 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 44-60 (2009) (discussing
the difficulties that arise when determining the scope of a precedent). Schauer
writes, "It is easy to say that a court is expected to follow a past decision ... but it
is rarely easy to say what counts as a past decision." Id. at 44.
100 EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 82, at 67, 82
tbl.2-6 (noting that "[rieview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion" and detailing the Court's low rates of discretionary review).
101 For proposals on how lower courts should rule in these situations, see Igor
Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2085, 2105 (1995) (proposing
accommodating concurring opinions to the extent they are numerically necessary
to the judgment and compatible with the rule stated by the majority); Tristan C.
Pelham-Webb, Note, Powelling for Precedent: "Binding" Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 693, 695, 733 (2009) (noting confusion in the lower courts and
counseling against giving precedential value to concurrences that conflict with
majority opinions).
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and even his fellow Justices, "how to count to five."' 0 2 By that
he meant that the way to make binding law was to garner five
votes for a single opinion, rendering it the opinion for the
Court-binding on lower courts and, except when explicitly
overruled, the Supreme Court itself. When five Justices join an
opinion, the opinion's author writes not for herself but for a
"court."
The Court itself has made clear the binding nature of the
rule set out in majority opinions. In Hutto v. Davis, a per
curiain Court warned: "[Uinless we wish anarchy to prevail
within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court
must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."103
And in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Supreme Court's test for overruling asked not
whether a prior decision should be overturned, but whether a
particular rule should be. 0 4
The Court also has stressed that, as against a majority
opinion, concurrences are not the law. For example, Maryland
v. Wilson'0 5 was a follow-on case from Rakas v. Illinois, which
held that individuals in an automobile not their own lacked
standing to challenge a search of that vehicle.106 In Rakas,
Justice Lewis Powell (with Chief Justice Warren Burger), joined
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, but also wrote a
102 Katharine Q. Seelye, With Gentle Humor, Brennan Is Buried, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/30/us/with-gentle-humor-
brennan-is-buried.htmil [https://perma.cc/C7UM-252R] ("While I was with him,
he might tell me some things that were true, like how to count to five,' Mr. Souter
recalled, referring to the magic number of votes needed for a majority opinion.").
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the
Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1099, 1102 (1997) ("The
most important rule, he would declare, is the 'rule of five'-i.e., the Court decides
cases by a majority vote of at least five Justices."); see also Mark Tushnet, Themes
in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 748, 763-67 (1995) ("Some clerks
understood Brennan to mean that it takes five votes to do anything, others that
with five votes you could do anything.").
103 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
104 See 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("Thus, for example, we may ask whether the
rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability,...
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation,...
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule
no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, . . . or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification ... ." (emphases added) (internal citations
omitted)).
105 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
106 See 439 U.S. 128, 148-50 (1978).
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separate concurrence.1 0 7 In Maryland v. Wilson, Maryland re-
lied on Justice Powell's concurrence in Rakas to argue that the
Fourth Amendment rules applicable to automobile searches
were less protective even than the majority in Rakas had
held.10s Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected Maryland's argument for relying on a mere concur-
rence, which could not "constitute[] binding precedent." 0 9
In short, the rule of five indicates both that opinions at-
tracting five (or more) Justices are binding on lower courts, and
that concurrences-even concurrences from Justices who join
a majority opinion-do not "constitute[ ] binding precedent."
Combined, these two sides of the rule teach lower courts that
they must obey majority opinions, and that they should not
follow concurrences at odds with those majority opinions.
2. The Marks Rule
Lest there be residual doubt, the exception proves the rule.
When no opinion has garnered a majority vote, and thus there
is only a plurality, the Justices have told lower courts they then
should look to concurring opinions to determine the holding of
a case. That is, unlike majority opinions, plurality opinions are
binding neither on the Supreme Court nor on lower courts.110
Rather, cases with only a plurality decision are governed by the
Marks rule, which states, "When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.'""' Thus, Marks explic-
107 Id. at 150 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell frequently used concur-
rences to exercise "soft" judicial power over the future development of the law,
including in 5-4 cases. Pelham-Webb, supra note 101, at 749.
108 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412 ("Maryland ... argues that we have already implic-
itly decided this question by ... Justice Powell's statement in Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978) ....
109 Id. at 413.
110 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987) ("As the
plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the Court, we
are not bound by its reasoning." (footnote omitted)); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v.
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 96 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority does not
assert that the Cipolone plurality opinion is binding precedent, and rightly so.
Because the 'plurality opinion .. . did not represent the views of a majority of the
Court, we are not bound by its reasoning.'" (quoting CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 81));
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) ("While not a binding precedent, as the
considered opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviously be the point
of reference for further discussion of the issue.").
111 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169
n. 15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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itly invites attention to concurring opinions-but only in the
relatively rare instances in which there is no majority. And
Marks itself made clear that its rule applies "[wihen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices."" 2 Otherwise,
lower courts are tossed back upon the rule of five.113
In practice, both lower courts and the Supreme Court itself
have struggled to apply the Marks rule.11 4 What exactly consti-
tutes the narrowest grounds for a decision? Identifying the
rule in a Marks case requires close reading of multiple opinions
that may point in different directions." 5 Even when the an-
swer is not indeterminate, it may be obscure and therefore
encourage differing interpretations in the lower courts. Figur-
ing out which opinion constitutes the rule under Marks can be
especially hard when the various alternatives are not aligned
neatly on a one-dimensional policy line. Marks's practical diffi-
culties highlight one of the key disadvantages to seriatim mod-
els-lack of clarity-and in doing so emphasize the value of the
rule of five for all other concurrences. The rule of five gives
lower courts clear guidance-be bound by the majority opinion,
not the concurrence.
3. Shearson and Anticipatory Overruling
Further support for the view that the Supreme Court would
not think well of a rule instructing lower courts to follow a
concurrence rather than the associated majority opinion is that
the Court has frequently rebuked lower courts for engaging in
"anticipatory overruling" even when the lower courts know full
112 Id.
113 Richard Re has argued that the Marks rule should be abandoned alto-
gether in view of its practical difficulties. See generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the
Marks Rule (Jan. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3090620 [https://perma.cc/3UKS-HU6E (arguing
that the Marks rule should be abandoned and that only propositions garnering
majority support should be precedential).
114 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 48-49 (2010) (noting uncertainty
in how to apply the Marks rule following a fractured Court in Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600 (2004), and pointing out that "Ibly sending confusing messages, the
Justices run the risk of losing control over the direction of the law altogether.").
115 Indeed, Justin Marceau has found that in practice the Supreme Court
often subsequently adopts as the rule whatever view became most popular with
the Courts of Appeals, making the exercise a circular one. See Justin Marceau,
Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CoNN.
L. REV. 933, 975 (2013) ("[Tihe available cases suggest that lower courts play an
important role in defining the scope and application of prior Supreme Court
plurality decisions.").
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well that a pre-existing majority opinion will not spell the out-
come of the present case.116
The anticipatory overruling cases present lower courts with
a dilemma much like the one described above. What if the
Supreme Court has, in case # 1, handed down a rule, but
later-in case #2-the Court (without explicitly disturbing its
prior holding in case # 1) seriously calls the earlier rule into
question. Should the lower court follow the rule in case # 1,
which technically is still binding? Or should it read the tea
leaves, and follow the clear implications of case #2?
The Supreme Court resolved this question in Rodriguez de
Qugas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., " 7 holding that lower
courts must not anticipatorily overrule binding Supreme Court
opinions. In Shearson' 1o the Fifth Circuit faced a question the
Supreme Court already had decided, in a case called Wilko v.
Swan.119 By the time the lawsuit in Shearson was filed,
though, Wilko was already on the ropes. In a 1987 case, Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court strongly
criticized the logic of its own holding in Wilko, though it did not
overrule it. 120
Confronted with this dilemma, the Fifth Circuit chose dis-
ingenuousness: it pretended to follow Wilko even while disre-
garding it. The Fifth Circuit explained its dilemma: "The
McMahon majority opinion does not expressly overrule Wilko;
the precise issue . . . was not before the court. Nevertheless,
the reasoning in McMahon completely undermined Wilko
116 Scholars have debated the merits of anticipatory overruling in limited cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-
Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1, 82 (1994)
(arguing that "[tihe orthodox view that prediction is inherently incompatible with
the judicial function must be revisited"); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule
ofLaw, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715 (1995) (arguing that although judges may find it
tempting to make predictions, "[they should resist the temptation because the
prediction model undermines the rule of law by over-emphasizing the role of
individual judges").
117 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
118 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th
Cir. 1988).
119 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The question was whether contractual agreements to
arbitrate could apply to claims brought under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933. In Wilko, the Court held that predispute agreements could not be enforced
to compel arbitration of a claim arising under Section 12(2). Id. at 438.
120 In McMahon, the Supreme Court ruled that claims brought under a parallel
provision of a securities statute-Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934-could be arbitrated. 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987). And the claims in McMa-
hon were difficult to distinguish on principle from the claims in Wilko.
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. . . ."121 Thus, the lower court attempted to resolve the di-
lemma by asserting that it was simply adhering to a new,
broader rule announced by McMahon.122 But its own opinion
belied that characterization. In a parenthetical, it quoted one
of its own prior cases for the proposition that "McMahon under-
cuts every aspect of Wilko v. Swan . .. ; a formal overruling of
Wilko[ ] appears inevitable-or, perhaps, superfluous." 12 3
The Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit's opinion
for what it was-following the clear implications of McMahon,
rather than simply applying the binding majority in Wilko-and
put the kibosh on it. In Shearson, the Supreme Court did
indeed overrule Wilko.1 2 4 But after doing so, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, chastised the Fifth Circuit for anticipato-
rily overruling a Supreme Court decision, rather than waiting
for the Justices to do so:
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own au-
thority should have taken the step of renouncing Wilco. If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of over-
ruling its own decisions. 125
Shearson thus reaffirmed the importance of the rule of five,
by making clear that the prerogative not to follow a binding
five-vote majority of the Supreme Court rests only with that
Court, even if other opinions cast doubt on the validity of the
prior majority opinion. The Justices have frequently invoked
that rule. 1 2 6 Indeed, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
has applauded lower courts for following the rule of Shearson-
121 Shearson, 845 F.2d at 1298 (footnote omitted). The Fifth Circuit noted that
the McMahon Court had explicitly rejected the possibility of overruling Wilko:
"While stare decisis concerns may counsel against upsetting Wilkds contrary
conclusion under the Security Act, we refuse to extend Witko's reasoning to the
Exchange Act. . . ." Id. at 1298 n.4 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234).
122 Id. at 1299 ("The Supreme Court opinion in McMahon, which binds us
here, turns solely on the adequacy of arbitration to resolve securities disputes. It
does not distinguish between the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.").
123 Id. at 1298 (quoting Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849,
850 n.3. (5th Cir. 1987)).
124 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
125 Id. at 484.
126 See, e.g., Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam) ("[Ilt is this
Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents." (quoting United States
v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001))); Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile
Cty., 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (1983) (granting a stay from a judgment of a district
court which was contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent, stating, "[u]nless
and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they appear to control
this case").
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even as it reversed them for doing so.1 2 7 This is directly analo-
gous to the logic of a lower court choosing to follow a concur-
rence in the same case as the binding majority.
4. The Implausibility of the Alternative
In addition to these three doctrinal indications that lower
courts must follow five-vote majority opinions as opposed to
concurrences that undercut them, there is also a weighty
counterfactual that makes the point. Imagine the question
comes to the Supreme Court in its naked form. There is a
litigant at the Supreme Court whose position in a case was
squarely foreclosed by a five-vote majority opinion, but the
lower courts went instead with the views of a concurring Jus-
tice who also had joined the majority. And imagine the Jus-
tices were asked what the lower court should have done:
followed the majority or the lone concurrence. Is it easy to
imagine the Justices holding that the lower court acted prop-
erly in following the concurrence rather than the five-vote ma-
jority? Everything in the discussion that has preceded this
belies the possibility, as does one's sense of discomfort for the
poor lawyer forced even to make the argument.
In short, although the Supreme Court has not said so
squarely, it seems readily apparent that as between a five-
person majority and a lone concurrence (that also joined the
majority), lower courts are to follow the former.
B. A Taxonomy of Concurrences
There is only one problem: lower courts do not seem to
listen. There is every indication that the lower courts often
ignore the rule of five and go looking for the binding rule else-
where-particularly in those lone concurrences.1 28
127 That is exactly what happened in Agostiri v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), in
which the petitioners urged the Court to reverse its prior decision in Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). In ultimately agreeing to do so, the Court noted that
"Itihe views of five Justices that the case should be reconsidered or overruled
cannot be said to have effected a change in Establishment Clause law." 521 U.S.
at 217. The Court nevertheless concluded that, despite the correctness of the
lower courts' decision to follow the Supreme Court's teaching in Shearson,
"[adherence to this teaching by the District Court and Court of Appeals in this
litigation does not insulate a legal principle on which they relied from our review
to determine its continued vitality," and on that basis reversed. Id. at 237-38.
128 See Pelham-Webb, supra note 101, at 707-12 (describing instances in
which lower courts adopted Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinions as
controlling).
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To get a handle on this behavior from lower courts, we need
a taxonomy of concurrences, so that we can then look to see
what lower courts are doing.
In the traditional nomenclature of the literature on judicial
decision-making, there are two types of concurrences: concur-
rences in the judgment only (also known as special concur-
rences) and concurrences in the opinion as well as the
judgment (also known as general or regular concurrences).1 2 9
In the former case, the concurring Justice signs on to the dis-
position of the case, but not to the majority (or plurality) opin-
ion. In the latter, more common, case the concurring Justice
joins both the disposition of the Court and also the majority
opinion.1 3 0 This distinction has doctrinal importance, because
a Justice who signs on to the disposition but not the opinion
cannot count for the rule of five to apply. 131
There is, however, another way to cut the concurrence
cake-one that is more apt to the discussion at hand. Our
taxonomy of concurrences has a heretofore unnoticed addition:
pivotal concurrences.
Plurality concurrences occur when a judge concurs in the
judgment but writes separately, robbing the plurality opinion
of a majority. This situation is when Marks applies. Plurality
concurrences arise most frequently in the Supreme Court
when four Justices form a plurality and are joined in the judg-
ment by one other Justice.1 3 2 Although the Court is split, the
Justice in the middle will have joined one side or the other in
the judgment only, thus giving that side the votes it needs to
issue a judgment resolving the case, but not the votes for the
129 See, e.g., Kirman, supra note 101, at 2084.
I30 Particularly in lower courts, judges do not always follow the strict rules
described above when deciding how to style their separate opinions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Martin,
J., dissenting) (styling a concurrence in the judgment as a "dissent" because of the
extent of his disagreement with the majority regarding one non-dispositive issue);
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 971 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Calla-
han, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment)
(concurring in the judgment and disposition but styling his opinion as "dissenting
in part").
131 See EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 82, at xxv
("[Justices who join [regular concurrences] are full-fledged members of the major-
ity opinion coalition, while those joining [special concurrences] are not.").
132 Of the 221 Supreme Court cases argued between 1945 and 2015 in the
Supreme Court Database that did not result in a single opinion for the Court, 130
(-59%) were decided by five Justices voting for the judgment. Fifty-three cases
(-24%) were decided by six Justices voting for the judgment, and 25 cases (-11%)
were decided by seven Justices voting for the judgment. The rest (-6%) are di-
vided among four, eight, and nine Justices voting for the judgment. See THE
SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 82.
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rule of five to apply. When that happens, we call the four-vote
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court the "plurality"
opinion, and we call the lone vote in the middle a "plurality
concurrence."1 33
A vanilla concurrence, by contrast, is an opinion of a Jus-
tice who does join the Court majority but also decides to write
separately nonetheless. The opinion is vanilla because it has
no impact. Formally, it counts for nothing. 134
A pivotal concurrence is a subset of the vanilla concurrence
in which, had the writing Justice not joined the majority opin-
ion, there would be no majority. Thus, pivotal concurrences
arise when there is a majority opinion, one or more judges
concur in the majority opinion but also writes separately, and
that judge's vote is numerically necessary to give the majority
opinion enough votes to become binding precedent. The opin-
ion is "pivotal" in the sense that without the votes of the pivot-
ally concurring Justices, there would be no majority opinion,
and Marks would apply.
Suppose the Supreme Court decides a case 7-2. Of the
seven-Justice majority, two Justices concur. In our taxonomy,
it does not matter if they join the majority opinion, or simply
join the majority disposition but write separately. Either way,
there is a solid five-person majority. Thus, they have authored
plain vanilla concurrences. Contrast that with the situation in
which three Justices concur, joining both the majority opinion
and one joint concurrence. In this situation, had the three not
joined the majority opinion, we would be in a plurality Marks
situation. This is a pivotal concurrence.
These pivotal concurrences are curious beasts. Why do
Justices choose to write them? Consider a Justice Swingvote,
who sits in the middle of a 4-1-4 court. It is easy to see why
Justice Swingvote might simply join the majority, and not write
a separate opinion, in the name of authority and clarity. It is
also easy to see why, in this situation, he might want to write
separately, and not join the majority opinion. If he has very
different views from the other four on his side of the case, he
will want to express them. Especially in the confused world of
Marks, his separate opinion might be taken as the law itself. 1 3 5
133 Plurality concurrences are thus a subset of special concurrences, because
they can only arise when the concurring Justice joins the judgment but not the
opinion of the four-vote plurality.
134 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (noting that a
statement "contained in a concurrence" did not "constitute[ ] binding precedent").
135 See Ledebur, supra note 3, at 900 (noting the possibility that an opinion
signed by a single Justice can become binding precedent).
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And even if not, in depriving the other four of a majority opin-
ion, he leaves the issue open enough for possible
reconsideration.
But why would Justice Swingvote join the majority and
write separately at the same time-particularly if Swingvote's
opinion undercuts what the majority had to say? It is one thing
if Swingvote writes alone only to note some specially determi-
native fact, or to indicate disagreement on a subsidiary issue.
It is quite another if Swingvote seems to be talking out of both
sides of his mouth.
Take the curious case of Thornton v. United States.'3 6
Thornton asked whether New York v. Belton's 37 "automobile
exception" to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on warrant-
less searches applied even after the driver of the automobile
had departed the vehicle and then was taken into custody.' 3 8
In Belton the Supreme Court held that if the police arrest the
driver of an automobile, the car can be searched without a
warrant incident to a lawful arrest, whether or not there was
any cause to believe evidence would be found.13 9 Belton was a
problematic decision from the start: the rationale for a search
incident to lawful arrest is to keep the arrestee from destroying
any nearby evidence or grabbing a weapon to harm an of-
ficer.1 4 0 But if the suspect is immediately handcuffed and put
in the back of a police car, that rationale makes no sense. 141
Thornton was worse yet, for before the arrest even occurred the
suspect had left his vehicle and was walking away-and then
after the arrest was cuffed and put in the squad car.1 4 2
Still, writing for a five-Justice Court, '43 Chief Justice
Rehnquist straightforwardly extended the Belton rule and held
that the search incident to a lawful arrest exception applied in
136 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
137 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
138 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
139 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61.
140 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) ("The exception [to the
warrant requirement] derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preser-
vation that are typically implicated in arrest situations."). These twin interests are
sometimes referred to as "Chimel rationales," as articulated in Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969); see, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 338.
141 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Chimel,
395 U.S. at 764) ("When the arrest has been consummated and the arrestee safely
taken into custody, the justifications underlying Chimers limited exception to the
warrant requirement cease to apply: at that point there is no possibility that the
arrestee could reach weapons or contraband.").
142 Torton, 541 U.S. at 617-18.
143 Except as to one footnote. See fd. at 616; id. at 624 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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such circumstances.' 44 Justice Scalia wrote an impassioned
separate opinion arguing that the Belton rule made no sense
(for the reasons just offered), and suggesting that he would
adopt an alternative rule barring warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles "incident to arrest," unless there was some cause to
believe evidence would be found in the car.145
But it was Justice O'Connor's vote that may have mattered
most. She joined the Thornton majority extending the Belton
rule, but authored a one-paragraph concurrence agreeing with
Justice Scalia. Which was it? Five Justices for Belton (and its
extension)? Or not? Justice O'Connor explained only that:
I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with the state
of the law in this area. ... While the approach Justice Scalia
proposes appears to be built on firmer ground, I am reluctant
to adopt it in the context of a case in which neither the
Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to
its merit.14 6
Quite understandably, Justice O'Connor's decision left the
state of the law deeply uncertain.
Justice O'Connor's decision is a strange one. She could
have let go of the fact that Belton's continuing vitality was not
squarely presented (the Justices do that often enough), and
reached the merits of Justice Scalia's proffered alternative. Or
she could have insisted on rebriefing and reargument to ad-
dress the question squarely. Instead, she provided the essen-
tial fifth vote to make Thornton the law, while at the same time
undercutting it entirely. It is little surprise that five years later,
in Arizona v. Gant, a version of Justice Scalia's approach pre-
vailed. 147 But in the interim, the rule of five required lower
courts to apply a test they knew full well no longer had majority
support on the Court.
Notice how pivotal concurrences like Justice O'Connor's in
Thornton display a sharp tension between what the Justices
say and what they do. The rule of five suggests that the Jus-
tices consider themselves a per curiam Court. The "Opinion for
the Court" is just that. It speaks for all the Justices. But the
144 Id. at 623-24 ("So long as an arrestee is the sort of 'recent occupant' of a
vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to
the arrest.")
145 Id. at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
146 Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).
147 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (holding that the police may
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's
arrest if it is reasonable to believe the arrestee might access the compartment or
that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest).
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Justices act like they are a seriatim Court, in that they continue
to write separate opinions that call out for recognition. If not,
why write them? This conflict is cast in sharp relief in the case
of pivotal concurrences.
Pivotal concurrences bear explaining. Until we know what
motivates them, we cannot understand why Supreme Court
Justices continue to write them, and how we should think
about them. We take up this question in Part III. But first, we
turn to empirical data to show that although all indications are
that lower courts are supposed to adhere to majority rules and
ignore pivotal concurrences, often quite the opposite is
occurring.
C. The Lower Courts' Response to Pivotal Concurrences
When faced with a pivotal concurrence, do lower courts
take heed of the rule proposed in that separate opinion, or do
they adhere to the authority of the majority opinion? If lower
court judges viewed the Supreme Court as a strictly per curiam
court, pivotal concurrences-which by definition accompany a
five-vote majority opinion-should have no impact on lower
courts and little impact on future cases. Yet, as we saw from
the Lopez example that opened this piece, lower courts-under
some circumstances-plainly take pivotal concurrences seri-
ously.1 48 They act as though the Justices are writing seriatim,
and it is their job to determine independently what is the gov-
erning rule. How frequently does that happen?
1. Quantifying Concurrences
To get at the question of how lower courts treat concur-
rences-and pivotal concurrences in particular-we created a
new dataset containing over a half million citations to 480 ran-
domly-selected Supreme Court cases that included concur-
rences. Those 480 cases spanned sixty-six years, from 1946 to
2012. Citations to those concurrences came both from state
and federal courts, at both the trial and appellate levels.' 4 9
148 See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text.
149 During the sixty-six years captured by the data, lower courts cited to
concurrences accompanying these five-vote-majority cases in 34,218 decisions.
Citations by federal judges account for the bulk of these-24,569 (71.8%)-with
the frequency evenly split between the district and circuit courts. State appellate
courts cited to concurrences relatively less frequently (9,649) and state trial
courts significantly less so (651). In addition, we accounted for whether that
treatment was positive or negative (i.e., whether the lower court followed or distin-
guished the decision). All such coding is taken from the Westlaw database. In
addition to the two variables described, we also included the year of citation,
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To create our main independent variable of interest-the
type of concurrence-we hand coded the concurrences in our
480 Supreme Court cases into the three categories introduced
above: vanilla, pivotal, and plurality. Our protocol was as fol-
lows: We read the opinions in each of our 480 cases. If no
opinion garnered at least five votes, we coded the accompany-
ing concurrence as a plurality concurrence. If, on the other
hand, there was an opinion joined by at least five Justices and
at least one of those Justices authored a concurrence, we read
the majority opinion and the concurrence to determine whether
the concurrence stated a different "rule of the case" from the
majority opinion. If so, and if the number of Justices joining
that concurrence could have deprived the Court's opinion of its
majority status had they not signed on to it, we classified the
concurrence as pivotal; if not, we classified it as vanilla. 50
Table 2 indicates the types of concurrences we classified, as
compared with the more traditional nomenclature for
concurrences:
TABLE 2. TAXONOMY OF CODED CONCURRENCES IN 5-4 DECISIONS
Articulates Does Not Articulate
Alternative Rule Alternative Rule
Joins Majority Regular concurrence Regular concurrence
Opinion (Pivotal) (Plain Vanilla)
Does Not Join Special concurrence
Majority Opinion (Plurality)
To assess the influence of concurrence type on lower court
decision making, we used two different dependent variables:
total citations and citation rate.
Total citations are simply the total number of citations a
concurrence garnered since the date it was published. Of
course, this presents a bit of a problem, because the lower
information the citing court, and the "depth of treatment." Westlaw's "depth of
treatment" feature tracks how much discussion an opinion devotes to a particular
citation. For our purposes, we were only interested in whether a citation was
"examined" by the instant opinion, meaning that the court engaged in an "ex-
tended discussion of the cited case, usually more than a printed page of text."
Keycite Depth of Treatment, subheading to How to Check Citations, WESTLAWNEXT,
http://1scontent.westlaw.com/images/content/wncitations10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T35A-GVVX]. Throughout this analysis, we use depth of treatment as a
robustness check for our primary analysis.
150 Additional detail on our coding methods and data is available in the Tech-
nical Appendix (available upon request from the authors).
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courts have had more time and opportunity to cite to concur-
rences that have been in existence for a longer period of time.
To account and control for the varying age of the cases in our
data set, we standardized the number of citations by the deci-
sion's age. 1 5 1
We also calculated the rate at which concurrences were
cited by lower courts, calculated as the number of citations to a
concurrence divided by the total number of citations to the
decision overall.15 2 As an example: if Smith v. Jones is cited a
total of 100 times by the lower courts, and 10 of those citations
also cite to the concurrence in Smith v. Jones, the citation rate
would be 0.10 or 10%.153
The question we sought to answer was whether lower
courts pay attention to-or even follow-pivotal concurrences,
despite the doctrinal argument we advanced above that they
should ignore them and adhere to the majority rule. As we
have seen, if lower courts act in accordance with the Supreme
Court's dejure role as a per curiam court, lower courts should
ignore pivotal concurrences entirely.15 Even if concurrences
in general have some interest to lower courts-perhaps be-
cause they phrase an idea in a particularly clear way-we still
should expect that pivotal concurrences would be cited by
lower courts at rates no higher than they cite vanilla concur-
rences. 155 In both situations, five-vote opinions serve as the
binding precedent.
On the other hand, if lower court judges approach the Su-
preme Court as a defacto seriatim court-either to avoid rever-
sal, or because they feel at liberty to discern the governing rule
on their own-they would attempt to identify what rule to fol-
low based not only on majority opinions but also pivotal con-
151 To standardize these data, we divided the total number of citations to the
concurring opinion by the opinion's age as of 2013, the year our data were
collected.
152 In Westlaw, citations to concurrences are always a proper subset of total
citations to a decision, because citations to only concurrences appear as hits for
citations to the majority decision in the absence of narrowing criteria.
153 Concurrences need not be comprehensive in their approach to the issue at
hand. Pivotal concurrences, in particular, are likely to focus on the decision's
effect on an emerging area of law or a complicated issue not addressed by the
majority. In such cases, lower court judges might cite a majority opinion for an
Issue unrelated to that discussed by the concurrence. As a result, the pool of
lower court decisions used to define the denominator of the rate may be over-
inclusive.
154 See supra subpart II.A.
155 Formally, we would not be able to reject the null hypothesis that lower
court treatment of vanilla and pivotal concurrences are distinguishable.
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currences.e5 6 In this case, we expect to see citation to pivotal
concurrences at a higher rate than vanilla concurrences.15 7
Finally, in either event we expect plurality concurrences to
be cited more than pivotal concurrences, if only because evalu-
ating plurality concurrences is always necessary under Marks
to determine the holding of the case.15
2. Pivotal Concurrences: The Empirical Evidence
We begin with a perhaps surprising fact: pivotal concur-
rences are the most common type of concurrence in 5-4
cases.15 9 If Supreme Court Justices do not want lower courts
to pay attention to them, one might think they would avoid
writing them. But that is not the case. Pivotal concurrences
(about 42%) outnumber vanilla concurrences (about 15%) by a
nearly three-to-one margin in five-vote-majority cases. (The
remainder, about 37%, were plurality concurrences.) Figure 2
displays change in number of pivotal concurrences written over
time in our dataset, expressed as the proportion of all concur-
rences accompanying 5-4 decisions. From this you can see
that pivotal concurrences are not uncommon phenomenon in
Supreme Court decisions since the 1940s, and that even as the
Supreme Court's caseload has dropped substantially, pivotal
concurrences have remained common-thus as a percentage
matter becoming a more pervasive part of the legal landscape.
156 See supra pp. 3-5.
157 And ifjudges were using pivotal concurrences to support arguments based
in seriatim reasoning, such concurrences should be discussed with greater depth
than vanilla concurrences. In other words, citations to pivotal concurrences
should be more likely to be "Examined" (as Westlaw calls it) than plain vanilla
concurrences. We use the "depth of treatment" as a robustness check of our
analysis throughout.
158 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
159 Of our 480 cases, 178 (37.1%) were accompanied by plurality concur-
rences, 200 (41.7%) were accompanied only by pivotal concurrences, and 73
(15.2%) were accompanied by "vanilla" concurrences. The remaining 29 decisions
were accompanied by mixed concurrences (meaning that multiple Justices wrote
concurrences of different types or the concurrence was coded as both plurality
and pivotal with respect to different issues in the case). These were excluded from
the analysis for the sake of clarity.
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FIGURE 2. PROPORTION OF PIVOTAL CONCURRENCES IN 5-4
DECISIONS
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Analyzing these adjusted data, and consistent with our
hypothesis, we find that lower courts cite to pivotal concur-
rences significantly more frequently than they do to vanilla
concurrences. Table 3 displays the mean and median number
of total times lower courts cited each type of concurrence (ad-
justed for age). 16 0 Even by this rough measure, pivotal concur-
rences are cited significantly more often than are vanilla
concurrences, and nearly as often as plurality concurrences.
TABLE 3. TOTAL CITATION OF CONCURRENCES BY LOWER COURTS
Type Mean Median
Vanilla 2.9 0.8
Pivotal 4.0 1.6
Plurality 4.6 2.1
Total 4.1 1.6
As these citation counts make clear, lower courts treat piv-
otal concurrences differently from how they treat vanilla con-
160 As defined above, the total citations variable is adjusted by the age of the
original Supreme Court decision. See supra pp. 35-36.
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currences.16 1 If anything, they treat them more like plurality
concurrences, which-under Marks-lower courts are required
to consult in divining the governing rule. This provides some
support for our hypothesis that the lower courts are looking to
pivotal concurrences for guidance as to the governing rule,
rather than simply adhering to the rule of five.
But total citations do not tell the whole story. It could be
that pivotal concurrences are cited more often simply because
they are present in the sorts of cases that also are cited most
frequently. Thus, we need to control for the frequency with
which the case containing the concurrence is cited.
To address this possibility, we assess whether pivotal con-
currences are cited at different rates than are vanilla concur-
rences. As shown in Table 3, lower courts cited pivotal
concurrences in 3.7% of the opinions in which they cited the
case itself, as compared to a rate of 2.8% for vanilla concur-
rences. 1 6 2 The discrepancy between the citation rates for piv-
otal and vanilla concurrences again suggests that lower courts
treat the two types of concurrences differently, notwithstand-
ing the lack of any formal legal reason to do so. At the same
time, the pivotal rate is lower than the plurality rate-an un-
surprising result given that plurality concurrences, under the
Marks rule, are necessary to determine the holding of a case. 163
TABLE 4. CITATION RATES BY LOWER COURTS
Type Mean Std. Dev. N
Vanilla 0.03 0.16 130,375
Pivotal 0.04 0.19 403,386
Plurality 0.12 0.32 134,596
Total 0.05 0.22 668,357
This analysis, however, still is incomplete, in that it might
be omitting an important variable. An observant reader might
161 Difference-in-means tests confirm the statistical significance of these ob-
servations. We tested the statistical significance of the difference in means using
both a rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test and a two-sample t-test. The difference in
means between treatment of plain vanilla and pivotal concurrences was signifi-
cant at the p < 0.05 level; the difference in means between plurality and pivotal
concurrences was significant at the p < 0.1 level.
162 The statistical significance of this difference was confirmed by a two-tailed
t-test, which was significant at p < 0.001.
163 See supra section II.A.2. We find similar results when conducting this
analysis based on "Depth of Treatment" of the opinion accompanied by a pivotal
concurrence. For more information, see the Technical Appendix (available upon
request from the authors).
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notice that the cases we have discussed to this point tend to be
constitutional cases with important social and political ramifi-
cations. This raises the important question whether the phe-
nomena we are capturing is spurious-that is, these citation
patterns simply are a by-product of the lower courts citing
more frequently to constitutional, salient cases in general.
Thils is just a more refined version of the point we made just
above.) This is not an unreasonable concern, as prior studies
have shown that constitutional and salient cases are more
likely to be cited by lower courts than others, all else being
equal. 164
To disentangle these effects, we employ a simple, log-linear
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, regressing the
log citation rate (our dependent variable) on concurrence type
and issue importance (our independent variables).1 65 By using
OLS, we can control for issue importance (i.e., constitutional
cases and salient cases) to estimate the independent effect of
concurrence type on citation rates.1 66
If pivotal concurrences have an independent effect-that
is, if such opinions have an intrinsic importance separate from
the fact of the case's salience or constitutional nature-then we
would expect to see a positive and significant relationship be-
tween the presence of a pivotal concurrence and the citation
rate, even after controlling for those features of a case. Table 5
displays the results of three variations of this model (as robust-
ness checks).1 6 7
164 See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 118 tbl.7.1 (2006).
165 The standardized citation rate for all citations (i.e., those that are men-
tioned, cited, discussed, and examined) and for the rate at which lower courts
examine the concurrence is heavily skewed. To conform to the OLS assumption
that the dependent variable is normally distributed, we use the log of the stan-
dardized citation rate.
166 The estimating equation takes the following form: Concurrence type is
coded dichotomously (one if the concurrence is pivotal, zero if otherwise), as is
salience (one if the issue is salient, zero if otherwise) and if the decision addressed
a constitutional issue (one if constitutional, zero if otherwise). In addition, we
include an interaction term in order to control for decisions that are both salient
and involve a constitutional issue. Further, we employ robust standard errors.
167 Standard errors are listed below the coefficients. Model I compares the
effect of a pivotal concurrence to a plain vanilla concurrence (excluding plurality
concurrences). Model 2 compares pivotal concurrences to plurality concurrences
(excluding plain vanilla concurrences). Finally, Model 3 includes all concurrence
types, comparing the effect of pivotal and plurality concurrences on citation rate
to plain vanilla concurrences (the omitted reference category).
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TABLE 5. OLS REGRESSION OF CITATION RATE
(1) Comparing (2) Comparing (3) Comparing
Pivotal to Pivotal to Pivotal and
Vanilla Plurality Plurality to Vanilla
Pivotal 0.594** -0.215 0.599**
(0.200) (0.141) (0.199)
Plurality 0.826**
(0.200)
Vanilla (omitted (omitted (omitted
reference reference reference
category) category) category)
Salience -0.055 0.148 0.049
(0.257) (0.246) (0.219)
Const. 0.291 0.426* 0.324*
Issue (0.226) (0.179) (0.165)
Salience* 0.728* 0.294 0.504t
Const. (0.345) (0.297) (0.272)
Issue
N 292 394 464
The results of the three models largely support the hypoth-
esis that the type of concurrence influences the extent to which
the opinion will be cited by lower courts, even after controlling
for salience and constitutional issues. As suggested above, piv-
otal concurrences will produce more citations than vanilla con-
currences. This expectation is borne out by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient for pivotal in Model 1 (f8 =
0.594). While this effect is small when the case is neither sali-
ent nor constitutional, it is amplified in salient and constitu-
tional cases. 168 In salient constitutional cases, a pivotal
concurrence is predicted to receive 3.75 citations per year-
that is, 2.75 more citations per year than a vanilla concur-
rence, holding all else equal.
In addition (and as expected), pivotal concurrences are less
likely to be cited than plurality opinions, although this finding
is less robust and we are unable to reject the null hypothesis
168 The marginal effect of a variable is the effect that a one-unit change in the
independent variable would exert on the dependent variable. Calculating the
marginal effect of a variable when using a log-linear model is slightly more compli-
cated, as the one-unit change (without any additional transformation) reflects a
change in terms of the log value of the dependent variable. As a result, marginal
effects in log-linear models must be transformed to the inverse log, such that A, =
e, where c = 1 (the one-unit change) and P is the coefficient for the variable of
interest. Note that this means that the marginal effects will be non-linear.
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that plurality and pivotal opinions are cited at the same rate-
which in and of itself would support our broader point about
the importance of pivotal concurrences. 169 Taken together,
plurality opinions are expected to receive 0.46 more citations
per year than pivotal opinions. 170
This difference is even greater when the issue is both sali-
ent and constitutional in nature. In this situation, a vanilla
concurrence is estimated to receive 2.28 citations per year,
holding all else equal. Pivotal concurrences, however, are ex-
pected to receive 4.16 citations per year. This divergence is
even greater for plurality opinions, which are predicted to be
cited 5.22 times per year.
This simple analysis confirms, in a more rigorous way, the
result initially suggested by our descriptive analysis: pivotal
concurrences are cited notably more often than vanilla concur-
rences, and that difference is magnified in high-profile and con-
stitutional cases. Indeed, in some instances pivotal
concurrences are treated as more akin to plurality concur-
rences. All this is strongly suggestive of the fact that rather
than simply adhering to majority rules when pivotal concur-
rences are present, lower courts take account of the pivotal
concurrences in resolving the case before them.
All of this returns us to the questions with which we began.
Why are these concurrences written? What function are they
serving? If it were up to Chief Justice Roberts, he would-
much like John Marshall himself-"make it his priority ... to
discourage his colleagues from issuing separate opinions." 17 1
If he has indeed tried, the evidence suggests he has failed.
Lower courts appear to pay attention to concurrences-partic-
169 Recall that, in Model 2, plurality opinions are the omitted reference cate-
gory. In other words, the coefficient for pivotal reflects predicted effect on citation
rate as compared to lower courts' treatment of plurality opinions. In Model 2, this
coefficient is negative, meaning that pivotal opinions are predicted to be more
lightly cited than plurality opinions. This effect, however, is not statistically sig-
nificant. This means that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that plural-
ity and pivotal opinions are cited at the same rate.
170 As noted, Model 3 includes pivotal, plurality, and plain vanilla opinions,
using plain vanilla as the omitted reference category. Both the coefficients for
pivotal (.pkm = 0.599) and plurality (&was, = 0.826) are positive and statistically
significant, but of different magnitudes. When written in non-salient, non-consti-
tutional cases, we estimate pivotal concurrences to receive 0.82 more citations per
year than plain vanilla opinions, holding all else equal (1.82 total). Plurality
opinions, on the other hand, are estimated to be cited 1.28 more times per year
than plain vanilla opinions (2.28 total).
171 Rosen, supra note 5, at 105.
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ularly pivotal concurrences-on a regular basis, giving those
concurrences credit where the Justices would have them deny
it. Why is this so? What functions are served by these concur-
ring opinions, such that Justices keep writing them despite
widespread grumbling about them, and lower courts keep pay-
ing attention to them? It is to these questions that we now
turn.
III
CONCURRENCES AND LEGAL CHANGE
To identify the role of concurrences, particularly pivotal
concurrences, we now return to the puzzle we left hanging at
the end of Part I. Why did consensus fracture on the Supreme
Court around 1941, leading to a sharp rise in separate opin-
ions? This was, after all, a peculiar time for this fracturing to
reveal itself. Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan failed in
1937.172 By 1943, though, Roosevelt had-while losing the
battle-won the war.173 He had appointed seven ostensibly
like-minded Justices.1 74 One might have supposed this would
be a time of harmony on the Court. Yet, this was not the case.
Instead, intra-Court disagreement was so sharp that the popu-
lar media seized on it as a notable story.17 5 By examining why
separate opinions shot up in this period, we can shed some
light on the role concurrences-particularly pivotal concur-
rences-play today.
Building on the work of prior scholars, we will show that
the rise in separate opinions actually began somewhat earlier
than 1941 and was motivated by the fights over constitutional
meaning and government power that were central to early
twentieth century history. We will explain the important role
that separate opinions came to play in facilitating the dramatic
legal change that occurred during that time, especially in high-
proffle, constitutional cases. Not only is this consistent with
our empirical findings, but-as we will demonstrate-to this
172 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 70, at 196. Roosevelt sought
to pack the Court with as many as six additional Justices. The ensuing debate
over the plan "riveted the nation for five months." Id. For a comprehensive histor-
ical and political account of Roosevelt's plan, see id. at 195-236.
173 See id. at 234 ("Roosevelt obtained enough appointments to transform the
Court entirely and the new justices changed the Constitution through
interpretation.").
174 See id. By 1943, the only non-Roosevelt appointees remaining were Jus-
tice Owen Roberts and Justice Harlan Stone. Id.
175 See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1947, at 73 (noting that, while the Justices were politically aligned, they
diverged on the question of the Court's proper function).
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day the citation to pivotal concurrences is particularly high in
these salient, constitutional cases. Our discussion focuses ini-
tially on dissenting opinions, because that is where the histori-
cal debate began.176 But that discussion will lead us to see the
special role of concurrences, both then and now-and particu-
larly pivotal concurrences-in signaling and motivating legal
change. We conclude by offering a theory of why Justices on
the Supreme Court continue to write pivotal concurrences, de-
spite condemnation by so many of a fractured Court.
A. The Collapse of "Acquiescence"
Although scholars initially set out to explain what seemed
to be a sudden rise in disagreement on the Supreme Court in
1941, other scholarship confirmed that something very differ-
ent had happened. What this is-and its timing-bears impor-
tantly on our question of the function of separate opinions.
First, it was not that "consensus" on the Court broke
down-i.e., that the Justices had just started disagreeing with
one another-but rather that the Justices began to give public
voice to long-standing, pre-existing disagreements. It turns
out the Justices had been intentionally suppressing their disa-
greement from public view in order to present a unified face,
just as we see on per curiarn courts. 177 Path-breaking research
demonstrated that prior to the early twentieth century the
norm on the Court was not so much "consensus" as "acquies-
cence": dissenting Justices went along with the majority to
present a common front.17 8
176 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 283-84 (discussing historical disagree-
ments among Supreme Court Justices over the proper role of dissents).
177 See Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual
Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 878 (1998) ("[Taft and
Hughes] emphasized the importance of collective judgments and of suppressing
dissent for the good of the whole. . . ."); Post, supra note 91, at 1328 ("Although
division and tension within the Court was high [during the 1929 term], it never-
theless decided cases with a degree of unanimity that would be quite unimagin-
able today.").
178 Post, supra note 91, at 1344-45 (attributing the high rate of unanimity in
the Taft Court to a "norm of acquiescence"). It was through this norm that the
Justices negotiated potential conflicts between their intellectual perspectives and
their perceived obligations of solidarity. Id. at 1346; see infra note 192 and
accompanying text.
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The evidence of this acquiescence norm was found in the
docket books of the Waite' 7 9 and Tafto8 0 Courts. Those docket
books made clear that although less than ten percent of the
published decisions of the Waite Court (1874-1888) contained
a dissent, the disagreement at conference was closer to forty
percent 18 1 Indeed, of the more than one thousand unanimous
cases decided by published opinion between the 1922 and
1928 Terms, some thirty percent required a vote change by a
Justice who originally disagreed in conference. 18 2
Although in theory votes changed between conference and
publication of a decision could be the product of persuasion, or
even just a struggle with a large caseload-the Court in this
period did not have the same certiorari discretion to hear cases
it has today' 8 3-the correspondence of the Justices during this
time indicated they were actively suppressing their existing dis-
agreement from the pages of the United States Reports. 1 4 Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes was characteristically colorful on the
subject, calling these cases "shut-ups," which is to say that
rather than publishing his views to the contrary, he would
simply stay mum.185 Holmes's prot6g6, Louis Brandeis, him-
self adopted this approach.18 6 Brandeis wrote to then-law pro-
fessor Felix Frankfurter that "there are reasons for withholding
dissent, so that silence does not mean actual concurrence ... I
sometimes endorse an opinion with which I do not agree, 'I
acquiesce'; as Holmes puts [it] 'I'll shut up.""'8 7
179 See Epstein et aL, Norm of Consensus, supra note 23, at 362, 366 (arguing
that the norm of consensus among members of the Court manifested itself
through "public unanimity in the face of private conference disagreements").
180 See Post, supra note 91, at 1332-33, 1340 (concluding that higher rates of
unanimity in decisions than at conference demonstrates a willingness among the
Justices to disagree in private, but a reluctance to do so in public).
181 Epstein et al., Norm of Consensus, supra note 23, at 366.
182 Post, supra note 91, at 1332-33. In an additional twelve percent of cases,
at least one Justice had to overcome uncertainty for the Court to achieve unanim-
ity. Id.
183 The Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction was created by the Certiorari
Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (commonly referred to as the "Judges' Bill").
184 Henry Abraham refers to the Justices' willingness to decide contrary to
their own lights as "bargaining" among Justices who were "willingly constrained
by group and institutional concerns." HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
235 (7th ed. 1998).
185 Post, supra note 91, at 1342 (quoting Stone Papers).
186 Id. at 1341, 1343 n.230 (quoting Holmes Papers).
187 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfirter Conversations, 1985 SuP. CT.
REv. 299, 328. Similarly, Hughes told then-Associate Justice (and relatively fre-
quent dissenter) Stone the following: "I choke a little at swallowing your analysis,
still I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to expose my views." ABRA-
HAM, supra note 184, at 235.
2018]1 861
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:817
It also became clear that the Justices were doing this for
many of the same reasons we have seen around the globe for
adopting a per curiarn practice.188 The clarity of the law and
the credibility of the Court seemed to demand it.1 89 Thus,
Judge Learned Hand described "an image of unity expected to
produce 'the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the au-
thority of a bench of judges so largely depends.'"o9 0 Or, as
Justice Butler wrote Justice Stone, "I shall in silence acqui-
esce. Dissents seldom aid in the right development or state-
ment of the law. They often do harm. For myself I say: 'Lead us
not into temptation.'"' 9 '
Moreover, the breakdown in acquiescence did not occur in
one fell swoop in 1941, but actually over a decade earlier and
happened more gradually. Chief Justice Taft, who served from
1921 to 1930, was a fanatic about suppressing disagreement
from the public eye.1 9 2 But his successors-Charles Evans
Hughes and Harlan Fiske Stone-believed Justices should feel
free to express their deeply-felt differences. '93 Empirical stud-
188 See Post, supra note 91, at 1274 ("Justices of the Taft Court felt presump-
tively obligated to join Court opinions, even if they disagreed with their content, so
as to preserve the influence and prestige of the Court."). Post points to evidence
that dissent was suppressed during the 1920s to "fend off external attacks,"
including congressional proposals to limit the Court's ability to overturn acts of
Congress as unconstitutional. Id. at 1314-15. Interestingly, he notes that "the
Court may actually have striven harder to preserve unanimity as internal rates of
dissensus at Conference increased." Id. at 1345.
189 See id. at 1344 ("The Justices preserve their differences, but they each
assume that in the absence of strong reasons, these differences should be put
aside so that the Court can present a united front to the public . . . .").
190 Id. (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72-73 (1958)).
191 ABRAHAM, supra note 184, at 235.
192 WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 61 n.63 (1964). Taft
often "tried to turn a dissenting opinion into silent acquiescence." ABRAHAM, supra
note 184, at 235. He wrote, "I don't approve of dissents generally . .. [lit is more
important to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to
record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have
it settled either way." Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 83, at 381. Taft had
chaired the American Bar Association Committee that drafted the 1924 Canon of
Judicial Ethics, which stated the following: "It is of high importance that judges
constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote
solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision....
Except in cases of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle,
dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort." ABA Canon of
Judicial Ethics, Canon 19 (1924), reprinted in LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 137 (1992).
193 Stone believed that "[siound legal principles ... never sprang full-fledged
from the brains of any man or group of men," and concluded it is not "the appro-
priate function of a Chief Justice to attempt to dissuade members of the Court
from dissenting." Walker, Epstein & Dixon, supra note 83, at 379 (quoting AL-
PHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 608, 629 (1956)).
Hughes believed that "[w~hen unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of con-
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ies suggest that public disagreement on the Court started to
become common during Hughes' tenure,19 4 and that rather
than a sharp break in 1941, there was a "more incremental
rate of change across the Hughes, Stone and Vinson
Courts."1 9 5 As we will see, dissenting voting blocs were starting
to appear even during Taft's tenure, much to his chagrin.
In short, the Justices were not actually so unified until
1941. Rather, they had tried to shield their disagreement from
the public, and this was cracking apart in the early decades of
the twentieth century.
B. Why Acquiescence Collapsed
The question is why this was happening. And here, the
answer lies not in empirical data, but in history. Looking only
to the numbers misses the fact that there was something quite
profound going on at the time, which explains the Justices'
concern for public confidence in the first place.
The late 1800s through the mid- 1900s played host to a
political and class war in the United States. The Populist and
Progressive movements supported, and won passage of, a num-
ber of pieces of dramatic social and economic legislation, in-
cluding the income tax, minimum wage laws, maximum hour
laws, and widespread regulation of vital national industries. 196
Conservatives, believing such laws reflected economic theories
that were socialist if not communist, viewed them with
alarm. 19 7 The fact that the laws in question were adopted by
majority rule did little to placate them. They sought recourse
in the Constitution. As then-Senator and soon-to-be Supreme
Court Justice George Sutherland said, "The written constitu-
tion is the shelter and the bulwark of what might otherwise be
a helpless minority."1 98
viction, it strongly commends the decision to public confidence," but when convic-
tion was at stake, Hughes felt that "merely formal" unanimity "is not desirable ...
whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time." CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1928) (emphasis added).
194 See Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 177, at 888, 892 (finding an increase in
dissents during the tenures of Taft and Hughes).
195 Marcus E. Hendershot et al., Dissensual Decision Making: Revisiting the
Demise of Consensual Norms Within the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RES. Q. 467,
468 (2013) (examining the total number of concurring and dissenting votes cast
rather than the percentage of cases that contain at least one concurrence); accord
Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 177, at 892 (noting that the data "point to the distinct
possibility of an earlier, more gradual change in norms").
196 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 70, at 168-71.
197 See d. at 171-73.
198 47 CONG. REC. 2800 (1911) (Statement of Sen. Sutherland).
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Tasked with interpreting the "written constitution," the
Justices of the Supreme Court became caught in-indeed cen-
tral to-this conflict. Court decisions invalidated many of
these laws conservatives deplored, such as the now-famous
1906 case of Lochner v. New York.1 99 Decisions during the
Lochner era made the Court a major issue in the 1912 and
1924 elections. 200 Hughes's tenure as Chief Justice, smack in
the middle of all this, was one of the most volatile for the Su-
preme Court. 2 0 1 And the fight over Franklin Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan following the 1936 election, triggered by judicial
decisions in these contentious areas, was arguably the defining
moment for the modem Court.202
The struggle on the Court over these issues was intense.
Taft, who was quite ill, wrote his brother that "I must stay on
the Court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting con-
trol." 2 0 3 The other side saw it similarly. Hoover urged Stone to
step down from the Court and take a Cabinet position. Stone
declined, writing to a former clerk, "You know the battle of
ideas that is going on in the Court and consequently know how
difficult it would be for me to abandon the fight for anything
else."204
199 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64 (1905) (invalidating a New York state statute limiting
the number of hours bakers were permitted to work on the grounds that it vio-
lated "the right of contract").
200. Theodore Roosevelt ran against the Court and the Republican Taft as a
Bull Moose in 1912, guaranteeing Democrat Woodrow Wilson's victory. FRIEDMAN,
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 70, at 167, 179. In the Election of 1924, the
Progressive Party candidate, Robert LaFollette, attacked the Court but was ulti-
mately defeated by Republican Calvin Coolidge. Id. at 180-8 1.
201 Indeed, Caldeira and Zorn, two political scientists who identify the Hughes
Court as the relevant time period in which acquiescence collapsed, hit the nail on
the head in one sentence they utter in passing: "Indeed, some anecdotal evidence,
such as Taft's frustration with Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone in the late 1920s and
the conflict over the first New Deal in the middle of the Hughes Court, supports
the idea of an earlier shift in norms." Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 177, at 892.
("Anecdotal" hardly begins to describe what is well-established historical fact.)
202 WILuAM E. LEUcHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 162 (1995) ("[N]o
event has had more momentous consequences than Franklin Roosevelt's message
of February 1937."). Leuchtenburg notes that the struggle resulted in "accept-
ance of a substantial change in the role for government," the "reordering of prop-
erty rights," and the appointment of Justices more protective of civil rights. Id. As
a result, virtually all of the Bill of Rights was later incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment and an expansive reading of the Commerce Clause made
possible an expansive role for the federal government. Id.
203 Post, supra note 91, at 1325-26 (quoting Letter from William Howard Taft
to Horace Taft (Nov. 14, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 315) and Letter from William
Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 316)).
204 Id. at 1321 (quoting Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Milton Handler (Feb.
17, 1929) (Stone Papers)).
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And it was this struggle on the Supreme Court that signifi-
cantly affected the Justices' opinion-writing and opinion-publi-
cation practices. Two of history's "great dissenters"-John
Marshall Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes-emerged during
this time. 205 Harlan dissented in 1895 from the Court's deci-
sion striking down the income tax. 2 0 6 Both wrote in dissent in
Lochner.207 Holmes and Brandeis, later joined by Stone, dis-
sented in many notable cases. 208 Just a month before he had a
massive stroke that ultimately lead to his replacement by
Hughes, Taft wrote: "Of course we have a dissenting minority of
three in the Court. I think we can hold our six to steady the
Court. Brandeis is of course hopeless, as Holmes is, and as
Stone is."2 0 9
Little surprise then that public expressions of disagree-
ment tended to be reserved for constitutional cases. Brandeis,
in private correspondence with then-Professor Felix Frank-
furter, explained that although "there is a good deal to be said
for not having dissents," in some cases-important ones-they
were warranted.2 10 Brandeis first classed as "important"
"whether it's constitutionality or construction" and then later
elaborated: in most cases "[y]ou want certainty and definite-
ness & it doesn't matter terribly how you decide so long as it is
settled."2 11 In "constitutional cases," by contrast, "since what
is done is what you call statesmanship, nothing is ever set-
tled-unless statesmanship is settled & at an end."2 12
205 The first Justice Harlan earned a reputation as a "Great Dissenter" for his
dissents in constitutional cases which frequently reached the Court after 1891.
LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 164 (1992). Justice Holmes earned the title
"The Great Dissenter" following his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). BARTH, supra note 2, at 6; see also Kelsh, supra note 33, at 170 (describ-
ing the Four Horsemen, which consisted of Justices Pierce Butler, Willis Van
Devanter, George Sutherland, and James McReynolds, as a bloc of Justices who
"repeatedly emphasized the limited regulatory powers of state governments").
206 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 638 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), majority opinion superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONsr. amend. XVI.
207 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, White, & Day, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
208 Kelsh, supra note 33, at 169-70.
209 Post, supra note 91, at 1325-26 (quoting Letter from William Howard Taft
to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 316)).
210 Id. at 1351 (quoting Urofsky, supra note 187, at 314).
211 Id. at 1345, 1351 (quoting Urofsky, supra note 187, at 328, 314).
212 Id. at 1351 (quoting Urofsky, supra note 187, at 314).
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C. The Value of Dissensus: Signaling and Smoothing
Now that we see how the Court was moving away from a
per curiam model at the turn of the twentieth century, and
more Justices were starting to write separate opinions in con-
stitutional cases, it is time to examine what role those separate
opinions played. We begin by discussing dissents and move to
concurrences.
Dissent in big-ticket constitutional cases served (and
serves) two important functions. It provides an important sig-
naling function to the world outside the Court. And it helps,
ironically, to smooth the process of constitutional change.
Those who wrote the dissenting opinions focused on the
signaling function they served. For Brandeis, it was precisely
because nothing was ever "settled" in constitutional cases that
the dissents were particularly important. Not internally (for the
Justices already knew how one another felt), but as indicators
to the outside world about the possibility of a different consti-
tutional vision. 2 13 We now understand that in a constitutional
democracy, dissents such as these can prove to be rallying
cries for social movements that eventually achieve constitu-
tional change. 2 1 4 The dissents that Taft and his conservative
colleagues so deplored fanned the fires of constitutional change
that occurred beginning in 1937. And the same has proven
true in other areas of constitutional contention, be it the death
penalty, abortion, or gender and race equality, among
others.2 15
Indeed, suggest John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, the
signaling function of separate opinions may be especially im-
portant in "complex and emotional issues such as abortion,
213 See BARTH, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("[A] dissent of this sort is not an attempt to
win over one's colleagues .... The most that the dissenter can hope to do ... is to
persuade contemporaries off the court that his associates were mistaken, to mo-
bilize public opinion against them. . . .").
214 As Robert Post explains, and as the events of 1937 themselves made quite
clear, "Such a crude distinction between courts and the people, between law and
politics, is very difficult to sustain in a democracy." Post, supra note 91, at 1357.
For example, Post and Reva Siegel note that, in fact, Justice Scalia used his
dissents to "mobilize critics of the decision." Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 399
(2007). Justice Scalia fully recognized "the practical and expressive power of
judicial decisions does not shut down politics; it can instead inspire Americans to
struggle passionately to shape the exercise of judicial review." Id.
215 See generally LEGAL CHANGE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S SOcIAL MOVEMENTS
(Jennifer Weiss-Wolf & Jeanine Plant-Chirlin eds., Brennan Center for Justice,
2015) (discussing the role of the courts in shaping public discourse to effect
constitutional change).
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euthanasia, and affirmative action." 2 16 In such cases, "[tihe
open display of competing viewpoints invites the attentive and
affected public to discuss, argue, petition for new laws, and
otherwise work to shape these controversial policies." 2 17 For
example, "in the sequence of cases from Roe to Casey, the
multiple opinions offered by the various Justices are best un-
derstood as attempts to persuade the state legislatures, inter-
est groups, members of Congress, and the people themselves
about what kind of abortion policies ought to be permitted
under the Constitution."2 18
Dissent serves a second function as well: smoothing the
path of constitutional change. This function is at first counter-
intuitive, given that dissent can fan the flames of opposition.
But the path of the law would seem impossibly erratic without
dissents to telegraph which way the Justices might head. Con-
sider the Justices' path on the issues that were critical to FDR's
Court-packing plan and its rejection. In Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., in 1936, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, limited Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce with interstate effects. 2 19
Just one year later, after the Court-packing plan was an-
nounced, the Court reversed direction on the question in Jones
& Laughlin Steel.220 Imagine the New Deal Court overruling
Carter Coal just one year after releasing it, without any dissent
in Carter Coal. Dissents pave the way, in the public mind, to
understand that there is disagreement, and that because of it
the law can be in flux.
Indeed, absent clear expressions of where the Justices
stand, sudden reversals undermine judicial legitimacy, a point
that was on full display in the New Deal Court's path on mini-
mum wage and maximum-hours laws. In a string of cases
reaching from Lochner forward, the Justices tacked back and
forth on the constitutionality of legislation regulating hours,
wages and prices. For example, in 1923, in Adkins v. Chil-
216 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 31, at 1699.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 The majority struck down a statute authorizing local boards to determine
coal prices, wages, and hours, finding that the Commerce Clause did not include
the power to control the conditions in which coal is produced before it becomes an
article of commerce. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-306 (1936).
Writing separately, Chief Justice Hughes agreed with the majority that labor
provisions exceeded any proper regulation of commerce, but found that other
provisions related to the marketing of coal sold in interstate commerce were
severable and should be upheld. Id. at 317-23 (Hughes, C.J., writing separately).
220 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For a discussion
of the decision, see FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 70, at 226-27.
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dren's Hospital, the Supreme Court struck down a federal min-
imum wage law as a violation of liberty of contract. 22 1 In
Nebbia v. New York (1934), however, the Supreme Court up-
held New York's minimum price regulation on milk, in a 5-4
decision written by Justice Owen Roberts that seemed to pave
the way for a reversal on minimum wages. 222 Thus, there was
widespread shock when, on June 1, 1936, the Justices struck
down New York's minimum wage law in Morehead v. New York
ex reL Tipaldo, with Justice Roberts (again silently) joining the
majority-offering no attempt to reconcile his previous
views.2 23 Yet, the very next year, again as part of the "switch,"
Adkins was flatly overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, with
Justice Roberts silently switching his vote from Tipaldo.224 The
result? Widespread derision and serious skepticism that any-
thing other than politics was driving the outcomes.
The critical point here is that for all the concern about how
dissenting opinions disrupt a court's legitimacy, they play an
important role. Dissenting opinions speak over the head of the
majority to the public at large, indicating room for possible
legal change, and motivating social movements to achieve it.
And they help pave the way for that change in observers' eyes.
D. The Special Value of Concurrences: Identifying Fault
Lines
But what about concurrences? As we noted at the outset,
dissents have their fans precisely for the romantic cri de coeur
they represent. And, dissents do not really fragment a court's
reasoning or muddy the law's clarity; they represent the voices
of those who disagree. On the other hand, as we have seen,
critics believe concurrences do messy up a court's rationale for
its actions, leaving confusion about the current status of the
law.2 2 5
In truth, concurrences-and particularly pivotal concur-
rences-play a parallel role to dissents, and perhaps a more
important role at that. Dissents speak to the people, and the
future, but often at quite a distance. Given stare decisis and
other factors, majority decisions, especially major ones, seldom
221 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
222 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934).
223 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936).
224 West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 400.
225 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (collecting sources).
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are overruled, and even more seldom in short order. 226 Con-
currences, on the other hand, can do their work more quickly.
Concurrences point out possible directions for immediate legal
movement, encouraging lawyers and litigants to focus their
efforts in those directions.
Start with legal change: even more than dissents, concur-
ring opinions can smooth the process of change and thereby
enhance the Court's credibility. To see this, consider again the
decision in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, which
shocked the country by finding New York's minimum-wage law
unconstitutional. 22 7 Then, just a year later but in the middle of
the Court-packing fight, the Court upheld Washington state's
minimum-wage law for women in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
due to Justice Owen Roberts's seemingly incomprehensible
flip. What was going on here? Years later, in a confidential
letter Roberts gave to Felix Frankfurter before his death, he
explained his vote in Tipaldo on the ground only that New York
had not asked the Court to overrule its prior decision in Ad-
kins.228 Had he been asked, he said, he would have voted the
other way, as he did in West Coast Hotel. Though some ques-
tion the truth of this assertion, 229 suppose that it were true,
and suppose Roberts had merely said as much in a published
concurring opinion in Tipaldo. One suspects that the course of
constitutional history would have looked somewhat different.
Rather than a dramatic switch in time, there would have been
the perfectly ordinary and observable flow of judicial
dispositions.
226 For example, between 1800 and 2005, the Supreme Court overruled only
233 decisions (less than 1% of the more than 25,000 cases heard). On average,
twenty-six years passed between the promulgation of the original decision and its
overruling. EPSTEIN ETAL., COMPENDIUM, supra note 82, at 226 tbl.2-17, 252 tbl.3-2
(original analysis).
227 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 70, at 205 (describing shock,
indignation, and disappointment following the ruling).
228 Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314-15
(1955).
229 Michael Ariens has questioned the honesty of this account, speculating
that Frankfurter may have made up the letter after the fact as part of an attempt
to shore up the legitimacy of the Court and defend it from accusations of overt
political engagement. See Michael Ariens, A Thrice Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107
HARV. L. REv. 620, 624-25 (1994). But see FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE,
supra note 70, at 499 n.326 (defending Frankfurter's account and answering
Ariens's arguments regarding the Roberts letter). Frankfurter's account does
comport with the majority opinion in Tipaldo, which explicitly declined to consider
the constitutionality of Adkins, finding that the plaintiff was "not entitled and [did]
not ask to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins case should be over-
ruled." Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 605 (1936).
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Indeed, Justice Roberts's silence in Tipaldo stands in sharp
contrast to what Justice O'Connor did in the Thornton automo-
bile search case, in which she agreed with the reasoning of the
dissent, but voted with the majority because the relevant is-
sues had not been briefed. 230 It is true that her voting one way
while expressing skepticism about the law in the other direc-
tion was peculiar. But at least she was candid about her rea-
soning. Everyone watching could understand that the law was
likely to change, as it did a few years later in Arizona v. Gant.
Concurrences keep changes in the law from appearing as an
incomprehensible bolt from the blue.
Concurrences do much more than smooth over legal
change, however; they also invite it in important ways. Con-
sider, in this regard, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Thornton, in conjunction with Justice O'Connor's own opinion
in the case. 23 1 Together they signaled a new way forward, and
made clear that there was substantial interest on the Court in
moving in that direction. That emboldened litigation that led
ultimately to the Supreme Court replacing the original Belton
automobile search rule with a new one in Arizona v. Gant.
Concurrences spell the path toward legal change, letting
litigants know precisely what issues to push. In Georgia v.
Randolph a sharply divided Supreme Court decided that if po-
lice seek consent to search a residence, and one occupant says
yes but another says no, the "no" prevails. 232 Justice Breyer,
roughly in the middle of the Randolph Court, joined the major-
ity opinion. But he also concurred, in a separate opinion that
advanced a multi-factor test for when police could ignore some-
one saying "no" to a consent search. 233 His many factors in-
cluded the presence of a claim of domestic violence. 234 Little
surprise, then, that shortly thereafter Randolph was largely
230 See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
232 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) ("[A] physically present co-occupant's stated
refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable
and invalid as to him.").
233 In contrast to the majority's categorical rule, Justice Breyer advocated a
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" in each case and stated that
.were the circumstances to change significantly, so should the result." Id. at 126
(Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer provided the critical fifth vote necessary to create
a majority. Justice Stevens, who also joined the majority, wrote a concurrence as
well. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissented. Jus-
tice Alito took no part in the decision. Id. at 105.
234 Id. at 126-27 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("In [the domestic abuse] context, an
invitation (or consent) would provide a special reason for immediate, rather than
later, police entry.").
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confined to its facts, in a case that involved allegations of do-
mestic violence. 235
Sometimes, the invitation to bring the new cases can be
quite explicit. For example, in Federal Election Commission v.
Beaumont, the Court struck down a challenge to a federal re-
striction on corporate campaign contributions. 236 However,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggested that he might join
the dissenting Justices to strike down such limits applied to a
different set of facts in a different case. He stated, "Were we
presented with a case in which the distinction between contri-
butions and expenditures under the whole scheme of campaign
finance regulation were under review, I might join Justice
Thomas' dissenting opinion." 237
The critical point here is that the critics' desire to limit
concurring opinions in order to provide greater clarity to the
law is quixotic, because that clarity may be both illusory and
wrongheaded. It is illusory because absent a super-strong
commitment to stare decisis on the part of Justices who sup-
press their concurrences, a later case is likely to divide the
court precisely along the fault lines the concurrence would
have suggested. In that later case, there likely will be a major-
ity for precisely the proposition on which the concurrence was
silent. It is hard to imagine that majority voting against its
preferences just because of a prior opinion. And it is wrong-
headed because revealing the fault lines is precisely what
moves the law.
Economic models of adjudication explain why the law will
move toward visible fault lines. Plaintiffs with something at
stake will be far more inclined to pursue appeals if they know
they might muster the necessary votes than if they think they
are rolling the dice or spitting in the wind. Thus, plaintiffs with
cases that turn on the fault will pursue their appeals; others
will abandon them.238
Indeed, the Chief Justice, who has been sharply critical of
dissensus on the Court, in reality has a tension on his hands.
As must now be clear, to discourage separate opinions is either
to discourage legal change, or to have it happen abruptly and
235 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (2014) (holding that
when the police lawfully arrest or detain the objecting occupant, they may then
search the residence). Notably, Justice Breyer joined the majority. Id. at 1129.
236 539 U.S. 146, 152-63 (2003).
237 Id. at 164 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
238 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 27-29 (1984) (hypothesizing that outcomes in
litigated cases tend toward fifty percent plaintiff victories due to selection effects).
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without notice. Deeply concerned as he appears to be with the
Court's institutional integrity, the latter is likely to cause real
concern. But even more problematic, the Chief Justice surely
wants that law to change in many areas, such as campaign
finance and affirmative action. To see that happen, he needs to
encourage litigation along the lines he would like to see the law
move. Thus, it may not be possible to have it both ways.
E. Important Cases and Pivotal Concurrences
If what we have suggested so far is true, then we would
expect pivotal concurrences to play their largest role in salient,
constitutional cases, in which there is the most at stake. And
that is in fact what the data suggest.
We saw in subpart II.C that the increased citation rates for
pivotal concurrences (vis-A-vis vanilla concurrences) remain
even after controlling for the influence of the case's constitu-
tional nature and salience. Our multivariate OLS model found
that pivotal concurrences are cited 82% more often than are
vanilla concurrences when all variables are included (4.16 ver-
sus 2.28 citations per year), and that the citation rate for piv-
otal concurrences is statistically indistinguishable from the
rate even for plurality concurrences.
But what is most telling is how often lower courts actually
refer to these pivotal concurrences in these constitutional and
salient cases. As shown in Table 6 below, courts cite to pivotal
concurrences in constitutional cases more than four times as
often as they cite pivotal concurrences in non-constitutional
cases (7.2% versus 1.7%).239 And though citation rates for
other types of concurrences are higher in constitutional cases
as well-and not particularly surprisingly given the stakes in
these cases-the difference is less pronounced (3.8% versus
2.3% for vanilla and 12% versus 10.7% for plurality). 2 4 0
239 Constitutionality was coded per the Supreme Court Database. See THE
SUPREME CoURT DATABASE, supra note 82.
240 The relatively small change in the plurality citation rate may be because
more than three-quarters of lower court citations to plurality concurrences are in
constitutional cases. Of the 134,596 total citations to decisions accompanied by
plurality concurrences, 102,453 (76.1%) involved a constitutional issue. In com-
parison, only 68% of plurality opinions issued by the Court are constitutional in
nature. In other words, the lower courts are citing to constitutional plurality
decisions at a higher rate than the Supreme Court is promulgating them. Com-
pare this with the fact that only 44,575 (34.2%) of 130,375 citations to decisions
accompanied by plain vanilla concurrences and 145,270 (36.0%) of 403,386 deci-
sions accompanied by pivotal concurrences were constitutional in nature. Both
percentages fall below the proportion of decisions accompanied by vanilla and
pivotal concurrences issued by the Court--42.5% and 61.5%, respectively.
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TABLE 6. CITATION RATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND NON-
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS BY LOWER COURTS
Type Mean Std. Dev. N
Constitutional Decisions
Vanilla 0.04 0.19 44,575
Pivotal 0.07 0.26 145,270
Plurality 0.12 0.33 102,453
Total 0.08 0.28 292,298
Non-Constitutional Decisions
Vanilla 0.02 0.15 85,800
Pivotal 0.02 0.14 258,116
Plurality 0.11 0.32 32,143
Total 0.26 0.16 376,059
Turning to important (salient) cases, we find a similar pat-
tern. As shown in Table 7, pivotal concurrences in salient
cases are cited more than three times as often as are pivotal
concurrences in non-salient cases (9.0% versus 2.8%). And
again, while courts cite all concurrences more often in salient
cases-and again, not surprisingly-the effect is significantly
more pronounced for pivotal concurrences than it is for either
vanilla (6.0% versus 2.7%) or plurality concurrences (17.4%
versus 11.7%).241
TABLE 7. CITATION RATE OF SALIENT DECISIONS BY LOWER COURTS
Type Mean Std. Dev. N
Salient Decisions
Vanilla 0.06 0.24 18,575
Pivotal 0.09 0.29 53,299
Plurality 0.17 0.38 27,411
Total 0.11 0.31 99,285
Non-Salient Decisions
Vanilla 0.02 0.15 107,885
Pivotal 0.03 0.16 347,637
Plurality 0.10 0.30 106,415
Total 0.04 0.20 561,937
Putting it all together, we find that rates of citation to piv-
otal concurrences are highest for cases that are both constitu-
tional and salient. Pivotal concurrences accompanying salient
241 Again, the differences in citation rates are statistically significant
(p < 0.001).
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and constitutional cases are cited approximately three-and-a-
half times as often (rising to 10.1% from 2.9%) as are pivotal
concurrences in all other types of cases (including cases that
are either only constitutional or high-profile). And just as with
the previous categories, citation rates to all concurrences are
higher for salient and constitutional cases, but the increase in
citation rate is less pronounced for vanilla (6.2% versus 2.3%)
or plurality (16.8% versus 10.5%) concurrences. These are
fairly dramatic differences.
TABLE 8. CITATION RATE OF SALIENT CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS BY
LOWER COURTS
Type Mean Std. Dev. N
Salient Constitutional Decisions
Vanilla 0.06 0.24 18,834
Pivotal 0.10 0.30 40,421
Plurality 0.17 0.37 23,334
Total 0.11 0.32 79,589
All Other Decisions
Vanilla 0.02 0.15 110,626
Pivotal 0.03 0.17 360,515
Plurality 0.10 0.31 110,492
Total 0.04 0.20 581,633
That means that courts are most likely to cite pivotal con-
currences in cases that are both constitutional and high-pro-
file. Indeed, for cases that are non-salient and non-
constitutional, lower courts cite to pivotal concurrences at
rates only slightly higher than they do for vanilla concurrences.
But for cases that are both salient and constitutional there is a
marked difference between how likely lower courts are to cite
pivotal and vanilla concurrences. Figure 3 shows the increased
citation rates to pivotal concurrences in cases that are high-
profile, constitutional, and both. 2 4 2
242 We find similar results when this analysis is performed using "Depth of
Treatment" as the primary variable. The full analysis is available from the au-
thors upon request.
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FIGURE 3. CITATION OF PIVOTAL CONCURRENCES BY LOWER COURTS,
BY TYPE OF CASE
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The empirical data are quite telling regarding the story we
have told. The Supreme Court's "norm of acquiescence"-its
attempt to function largely as a classic per curiam court-shat-
tered in the face of substantial disagreements following the
Progressive Era and into the New Deal. 2 4 3 This happened in
salient, constitutional cases because that is where the battle
was being fought: over the meaning and constraints of the
Constitution. And in those cases, the seriatim practice of writ-
ing separate opinions signaled, invited, and smoothed the pro-
cess of constitutional change.
To this very day, those are the cases in which the Justices
are least able to control their urges to write separately. In
which they seem to care least about a fractured court. And
when they do write separately, these are the concurrences that
get cited the most.
This, as we have argued, makes sense. It is these concur-
rences that signal the direction of legal change (or dead ends,
per the Lopez example with which we began), and that smooth
the way for that change when it occurs. These concurrences
play a very significant role, as the lower courts seem to appreci-
ate fully.
243 See supra subpart III.B.
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F. Coda: Why Pivotal Opinions Are Written
By now, it seems apparent why the Justices write separate
opinions in the volume they do. Still, it is useful spelling it out,
because it reveals some of the conditions under which we
would most expect to see them be written.
Consider a simple model of rational judicial thought. One's
clear preference would be to draft the majority opinion, and
particularly along the lines one would like.2 4 4 But that option
is hardly available in most cases. On a divided Court, however,
one can still exert substantial influence by writing separately.
Because, to quote one author, that opinion could "control the
future."245
This possibility of having influence with a concurring opin-
ion is clearly strongest with a plurality concurrence. Under the
rule of Marks v. United States,246 in cases with no majority
opinion, the precedent going forward is the narrowest grounds
for decision on which five Justices agree. As a result, the hold-
ing in a plurality case is often stated in a concurrence rather
than in the plurality. Thus, if a swing Justice is sure that her
concurrence would state the narrowest grounds for deciding
the case and that it is logically consistent with the plurality's
rationale, the optimal course is not to join the majority. As
Berry et al. explains:
[I1f a [J]ustice knows he can control the future by authoring a
single concurrence and we follow Marks to make it control-
ling, would it not be rational for a judge to do so? He has an
opportunity for disproportionate influence by writing
separately.247
But now we can see the appeal of pivotal concurrences: if
one suspects that a concurring opinion will not be a Marks
winner in this sense, the rational choice might be to write a
pivotal concurrence. Which is to say that a Justice can gain a
strategic advantage by joining the majority opinion but writing
separately, depriving the majority opinion of its practical force.
Those pivotal concurrences carry great weight, signaling the
course of the law to litigants eager for change. And, as we have
244 See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CoURT AND
THE ATnTUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 41 (2002) (elevating judges' policy preferences to
be the most important determinant of judicial decision-making).
245 Berkolow, supra note 3, at 305.
246 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
247 Berkolow, supra note 3, at 305 ("If this theory of judge self-interest is true,
however, why we ever get majorities must be explored."); accord id. at 352-53
(concluding that the Marks doctrine "should incentivize separate Uudicial]
opinions").
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seen, lower courts pay attention to them, despite the fact that
they ought to have no weight. It is easy to see why Justices do
not abstain given these incentives.
CONCLUSION
In making the case here, we realize we are swimming
against the tide. Concurrences are oft ignored by commenta-
tors; when they garner attention it is to condemn the fragmen-
tation of the Court and the egos of those who feel they must
write separately. And certainly, the phenomenon we identify
here, of pivotal concurrences, is-on its face at least-quite
odd. Why would a Justice join a majority opinion only to un-
dercut it at its very moment of birth?
What we hope to have shown is that common wisdom may
well be wrong. Concurrences have an important role to play.
They signal the direction of possible legal change. And nothing
does that more so than a pivotal concurrence, which exposes
the fault lines in the law, and gestures directly to a fault line on
the Court, where change can occur.
2018]1 877
